Strasbourg Court Jurisprudence and Human Rights in Turkey:

An Overview of Litigation, Implementation and Domestic Reform by Kurban, Dilek
  1 
 
JURISTRAS 
 
 
State of the Art Report 
 
 
Strasbourg Court Jurisprudence and Human Rights in Turkey:  
An Overview of Litigation, Implementation and Domestic Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
Dilek Kurban, JD 
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) 
 
 
 
 
Research Assistant: 
Elif Kalaycıoğlu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report prepared for the JURISTRAS project funded by the European Commission, 
DG Research, Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society 
(contract no: FP6-028398) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact Details: 
Dilek Kurban, Program Officer, TESEV, Bankalar Cad. No:2 Minerva Han Kat:3 
Karaköy 34420 İstanbul/Turkey email:dilekkurban@tesev.org.tr 
  2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………… 3 
 
II. THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY ……………. 3 
 
A. NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ECHR ……...…………4 
a. The Status of ECHR under Domestic Law ……….………...4 
b. Domestic Legal Framework on Human Rights ……..……...6 
B. JUDICIAL AND NON-JUDICIAL CONTROL MECHANISMS......8 
a. Judicial Review of the Protection of Human Rights…….... 8 
b. Non-Judicial Human Rights Mechanisms……………….....9 
 
III. LITIGATING STRASBOURG: CASE LAW, ACTORS, 
IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT ………………………………………. 11 
 
A. ECtHR CASE LAW .………………………………………………...12 
1. Freedom of Expression ……………………………………………14 
2. Cases Brought by Minorities under Articles 3, 5 and 6…………...15 
3. Property Rights ………………………..…………………………..16  
4. Freedom of Association………………………………………….. 18 
5. Respect for Home, Private and Family Life..……………………...18 
6. Freedom of Religion ………………………………………………19 
B. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ADVOCATING 
MINORITY RIGHTS ……………………………………………… 20 
C. STRATEGIC LITIGATION ……………………………………….. 21 
D. DOMESTIC EXECUTION OF JUDGEMENTS……………………22 
 
IV. LITERATURE REVIEW ………………………………………………. 26 
 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS AND 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE LAW…..26 
 
B. THE IMPLEMENTATİON OF THE EU ACCESSION CRITERIA 
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ 
JUDGEMENTS………………………………………………………29 
 
V. CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………… 32 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………35   
 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE CASES AND RESOLUTIONS………………………......41 
 
ANNEX I: SHORT VERSION OF THE STATE OF THE ART REPORT 
INTENDED FOR POLICY USERS…………………………………………………47   
 
ANNEX II: MAPPING OF RESEARCH COMPETENCES REPORT……………..58 
 
ANNEX III: TABLE OF CASES ………………………………  (separately attached) 
  3 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Turkey is a founding member of the Council of Europe, having become a member in 
1949, the same year the organization was founded.1 Turkey ratified the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 
and the Protocol No. 1 in 1954.2 While the convention did not arouse much interest 
among minorities and rights advocates initially, litigating in Strasbourg has become a 
commonly sought political and legal strategy after 1987. Three major developments 
took place in that year: the Turkish Government accepted the right to individually 
petition the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), made a formal application for 
membership to the European Union (EU), and declared a state of emergency in 
eastern and southeastern regions of the country. The significance of the first 
development does not bear elaboration. The second one is worth stressing because 
many commentators drew a link between the first two developments by arguing that 
Turkey’s acceptance of the individual petition mechanism was a strategic move aimed 
at facilitating its membership to the EU. Lastly, the rights violations committed by 
security forces during the state of emergency which formally lasted until 2002 caused 
a rapid increase in the number of petitions filed with the ECtHR.  
The central research question this report addresses is whether and if so to what 
extent the ECHR and the ECtHR case law served to enhance the protection in Turkey 
of human rights in general and minority rights in particular. In doing so, the critical 
role the EU accession process has played in this regard by exerting external political 
pressure on the Turkish Government will be evaluated as a major positive variable.  
The report assesses the nature of claims raised by minorities and minority 
rights advocates. It seeks to offer an initial analysis of the efforts by authorities to 
implement the ECtHR case law through general and individual measures. The rest of 
the report is organized as follows: Part II provides a brief analysis of the national legal 
framework pertaining to the protection of human rights and an overview of judicial 
and non-judicial monitoring mechanisms. Particular attention is given to the 
constitutional and legislative human rights reforms enacted in recent years during the 
the EU accession process. Part III offers an analysis of the nature of cases and 
controversies and the identity and litigation strategy of actors in applications lodged 
with the ECtHR. The execution of the ECtHR judgments through legislative and 
executive measures at domestic level is also discussed in this section. Part IV provides 
a brief introduction to the literature on the EU accession process and the ECtHR case 
law on Turkey. Part V offers preliminary conclusions on the impact generated by the 
ECHR protection system on Turkey’s framework and practice on human rights.  
 
II. The Protection of Human Rights in Turkey 
 
Turkey is a party to the major international human rights conventions3 and some of 
the human rights instruments under the auspices of the Council of Europe.4 Turkey’s 
                                                 
1 Turkey has ratified the statute of the Council of Europe on 12 December 1949 through Law No. 5456, 
which put into effect Turkey’s retrospective membership in the organization as of 8 August 1949. 
2 Law No. 6366, 10 March 1954, Official Gazette No. 8662, 19 March 1954.  
3 Among the major human rights instruments of the United Nations that Turkey has ratified, there are 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination.  
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foreign policy with respect to human rights treaties is based on ratification with 
reservations with respect to those provisions which grant additional rights to 
individuals belonging to minorities.5 With respect to conventions that are specifically 
on minority rights, Turkey’s policy is one of non-signature, as in the case of the 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
The purpose of this foreign policy is to ensure that with the exception of non-
Muslims, who are granted minority status under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, no 
minorities in Turkey are given de jure legal protection. 
The 1982 Constitution has a framework for the protection of civil and political 
rights. However, the letter and spirit of the constitution remains restrictive even after 
the series of reforms undertaken by the Turkish Government towards fulfilling the 
EU’s accession conditionality. Drafted in 1982, only two years after the military coup 
d’etat, at the behest of the military junta, the main preoccupation of the constitution is 
to protect the state vis-à-vis individuals. Towards that end, the constitution subjugates 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms that it grants to a doctrinal hierarchy, whereby 
the principles of laicism on one hand and national and territorial unity on the other 
seek to keep the expression of political dissent under control. 
 
A. National Legal Framework and ECHR  
 
Turkey has become a party to the ECHR and the Protocol No. 1 in 1954. Over time, 
Turkey has also ratified the Protocols No. 6 and 13. It has yet to ratify the Protocol 
No. 12, which has for the first time granted individuals a self-standing right to be free 
from discrimination, the exercise of which, unlike Article 14, is not conditional on the 
violation of a substantive provision of the ECHR. Turkey has also not yet ratified the 
Protocols No. 4 and 7. A recent constitutional amendment established the supremacy 
of international law, giving direct effect to the ECHR. Yet, the ECtHR’s relationship 
with the constitution remains the same: the judgments of the ECtHR are not binding 
on the Constitutional Court. They have persuasive authority. The reform process also 
sought to establish a framework for non-judicial protection of human rights. However, 
the various human rights institutions set up at the national and provincial levels are 
being criticized for their lack of independence from the executive.  
 
a. The Status of ECHR under Domestic Law 
 
For a long time, the status of international conventions in general and the ECHR in 
particular within the hierarchy of Turkish legal system has been a matter of contention 
among scholars in Turkey.6 Prior to its amendment on 22 May 2004, Article 90 of the 
                                                                                                                                            
4 In addition to the ECHR, Turkey is a party to the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. On 27 September 2006, it ratified the revised 
European Social Charter with reservations.  
5 This is the case for Article 27 of the ICCPR; Articles 17, 29 and 30 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child; Article 13(3) and (4) of the ICESCR; as well as various instruments of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe pertaining to the protection of minorities. For more on 
Turkey’s foreign policy on international instruments relating to minority rights, see Dilek Kurban, 
“Confronting Equality: The Need for Constitutional Protection of Minorities on Turkey’s Path to the 
European Union,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol: 35 (2003), 180-188. 
6 Fazıl Sağlam, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin Türkiye’de Kapatılan Partilere İlişkin 
Kararlarının Partiler Hukukuna Etkisi,” Anayasa Yargısı, No: 16 (1999), 261-271. (stating that the 
place of international conventions within the hierarchy of national laws is a matter of contention, 
particularly with respect to the ECHR); Zühtü Arslan, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk 
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Turkish Constitution read: “International agreements duly put into effect bear the 
force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these 
agreements, on the grounds that they are unconstitutional.”7 While there have been 
instances where courts stressed the supremacy of the ECHR over domestic laws, and 
even the constitution,8 there was no uniform view nor a uniform judicial practice with 
regards to which body of law should prevail in case of a conflict between the 
provisions of international treaties and national laws.9 This debate has been resolved 
in 2004 in favor of the monist view with the addition10 of the following clause to 
Article 90: “In the case of a conflict between international agreements in the area of 
fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect and the domestic laws due to 
differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international 
agreements shall prevail.” Pursuant to this amendment which gives direct effect to the 
ECHR, courts of general jurisdiction are now required to enforce the supremacy of the 
Convention over domestic laws. While the Court of Cassation and the Council of 
State referred in some of their judgments to specific provisions of the ECHR,11 it is 
not possible to speak about a uniform, consistent and principled judicial approach to 
the direct effect of the ECtHR judgments.  
The ECHR’s supremacy over national laws does not extend to the constitution. 
Pursuant to the jurisprudential tradition, the Constitutional Court is not formally 
bound by the ECHR. Instead, the court attributes to ECtHR judgments a persuasive 
authority of interpretation. That the Constitutional Court does not attribute the ECHR 
a supra-constitutional norm quality and almost never cites the ECtHR judgments12 
would not necessarily be problematic from a human rights point of view had there not 
been significant points of tension between the constitution and the case law of the 
Constitutional Court on the one hand and the ECHR and the ECtHR jurisprudence on 
the other. However, as will be discussed below, notwithstanding unprecedented legal 
reforms undertaken in recent years towards aligning national and international law, 
                                                                                                                                            
Anayasa Yargısı: Uyum Sorunu ve Öneriler,” Anayasa Yargısı, No: 17 (2000), 279 (noting that there is 
no consensus on the resolution of a conflict between domestic law and the ECHR and calling on the 
legislature to intervene through a constitutional amendment which would establish the supremacy of 
international conventions).  
7 Turkish Constitution, 1982.  
8 See e.g. a decision of the 5th Chamber of the Council of State on freedom of expression. Judgment 
dated 22 May 1991. E. 1986/1723, K. 1991/933 (ruling that states are under an obligation to extend to 
their citizens the rights and liberties guaranteed under international conventions they have ratified and 
to undertake the necessary arrangements in their domestic legal systems towards that end. Stating in 
dictum that Article 90 of the Constitution requires the execution of international conventions duly put 
into effect even where they are in conflict with the constitution.) 
9 For a brief discussion of the three different approaches to the implications of the phrase “having the 
force of law” for the resolution of a potential conflict between international conventions and domestic 
law, see Tülay Tuğcu, President of the Constitutional Court, “Opening Address on the Occasion of the 
New Judicial Year of the European Court of Human Rights,” Strasbourg, 20 January 2006, 4. 
10 Law on the Amendment of Various Provisions of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, No. 
5170, adopted on 7 May 2004, entered into force on 22 May 2004.  
11 Tuğcu, 5, citing the following decisions: judgment of 25.5.2005 of Civil Plenary of the Court of 
Cassation E: 2005/9-320, K: 2005/355; judgment of 13.7.2004 of 9th Penal Chamber of the Court of 
Cassation E: 2004/3780, K: 2004/3879; judgment of 24.5.2005 of Penal Plenary of the Court of 
Cassation E: 2005/7-24, K: 2005/56; judgment of 08.02.2005 of 13th Chamber of the Council of State 
E: 2005/588, K: 2005/692; judgment of 29.09.2004 of 5th Chamber of the Council of State E: 
2004/291, K: 2004/3370. 
12 Arslan, 274. This conclusion is supported by the President of the Turkish Constitutional Court 
herself, who stated that, as of January 2006, the Constitutional Court has merely cited four ECtHR 
judgments. Of these four decisions, one was cited in a 1999 judgment concerning a regulatory taking 
and three in a 2003 judgment on expropriation. Tuğcu, 6. 
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both the overall state-biased spirit of the Turkish Constitution as well as the restrictive 
interpretation it receives from courts fall far short of the ECHR standards. It is evident 
that the harmonization of Turkey’s legal framework with the ECHR will not be 
possible unless a new constitution is drafted which contains a civic notion of 
citizenship and a rights-based approach to the state-citizen relationship. 
 
b. Domestic Legal Framework on Human Rights 
 
The 1982 Constitution contains provisions extending a general protection for human 
rights. Article 2 enumerates respect for human rights as a fundamental characteristic 
of the republic. Article 5 lists the removal of obstacles restricting fundamental rights 
and liberties as a “fundamental aim and duty of the state.” The principle of equality is 
protected under Article 10(1): “[a]ll individuals are equal without any discrimination 
before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, 
philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.” Article 10(4) 
requires administrative institutions and authorities to comply with this principle.  
The constitution contains specific provisions on the protection of the rights 
and liberties studied in JURISTRAS. With the amendments of 17 October 2001 
generated by the EU accession process,13 this protection has expanded considerably. 
The constitution protects personal liberty and security;14 the privacy of individual 
life;15 the inviolability of the domicile;16 freedom of communication;17 freedom of 
religion and conscience;18 freedom of thought and opinion;19 freedom of expression 
and dissemination of thought;20 freedom of press;21 freedom of association;22 freedom 
to hold meetings and demonstration marches;23 and the right to property.24 
The 2001 constitutional amendments considerably narrowed the scope of 
restrictions brought on human rights under Article 13. The stated legislative purpose 
of these amendments was to bring the constitution in line with the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR.25 The amendments introduced the constitutional principle of proportionality, 
bringing the constitution in line with the case law of the ECtHR and the Constitutional 
Court.26 The reforms replaced the general restrictions embodied in Article 13, which 
                                                 
13 Law on the Amendment of Certain Provisions of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, No. 4709, 
adopted on 3 October 2001, entered into force on 17 October 2001. 
14 Article 19.  
15 Article 20(1).  
16 Article 21(1).  
17 Article 22(1).   
18 Article 24(1).  
19 Article 25.   
20 Article 26(1).  
21 Article 29(1).  
22 Article 33(1). 
23 Article 34(1).  
24 Article 35. 
25 İsmet Giritli, “2001 Anayasa Değişikliklerinin Temel Hak ve Özgürlüklere Yansıması,” Anayasa 
Yargısı, No: 19 (2002), 88-103. 
26 Law No. 4709, Article 2, amending Article 13 of the Constitution. The reforms thus brought the 
constitution in conformity with the post-1991 case law of the Turkish Constitutional Court, which had 
ruled that the restrictions brought upon fundamental rights should “not exceed reasonable criteria.” 
Giritli, 98. The Court required that such restrictions conform with the principle of proportionality, 
which it had defined in a 1991 judgment as follows: “That the means resorted for the restriction or the 
prevention of the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties are sufficient and necessary to realize the 
aim, and that the means and the end are proportional to each other.” Judgment dated 10.01.1991, E. 
1990/25, K. 1991/1. 
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had allowed the categorical limitation of rights and liberties on the basis a standard 
list of enumerated grounds,27 with a “differentiated and gradual restriction system”28 
based on right-specific restrictions enumerated in corresponding provisions.29 Another 
amendment made with the stated purpose of aligning the constitution with Article 17 
of the ECHR was in Article 14, which prohibits the abuse of rights and freedoms. As 
opposed to the previous text which entailed an ambiguous purpose-based ban, the new 
Article 14 now contains an act-based prohibition.30  
Notwithstanding these groundbreaking amendments, the constitution preserves 
its restrictive character which is fundamentally at odds with the ECHR. Towards 
protecting the state against the individual, the Constitution substantially restricts the 
exercise of rights and freedoms on the basis of the principles of territorial unity and 
laicism. This demarcation cuts across the letter and spirit of the constitution and is 
immediately observed in the Preamble, which prohibits activities contrary to 
territorial unity and laicism,31 principles listed among the “characteristics of the 
Republic” under Article 2. The over-inclusive reading of these principles by Turkish 
prosecutors and judges in the past has resulted in the dissolution of political parties 
and associations, the prosecution and conviction of human rights activists, journalists 
and intellectuals,32 and continues to do so. 
In addition to the umbrella clause of Article 14, a number of other provisions 
impose similar restrictions on the exercise of rights and liberties, such as Article 26(2) 
in the case of freedom of expression and Article 28(3) in the case of freedom of press. 
The letter and spirit of the Constitution reveals a hierarchy among the fundamental 
principles of the Republic, wherein laicism and territorial unity hang like Democles’ 
sword over the exercise of fundamental rights. This is evident in the Preamble which, 
despite its unconditional endorsement of the principles of laicism and territorial 
unity,33 conspicuously fails to pronounce the word “democracy” until the very end 
where it depicts the Constitution as a trust to “the Turkish nation to the patriotism and 
nationalism of its democracy-loving sons and daughters.”34  
The constitutional subjugation of rights and liberties to the ‘higher principles’ of 
territorial unity and laicism makes the establishment of a rule of law based on human 
rights prohibitively difficult. Reminiscent of the socio-psychology of the founding 
years of the Turkish Republic in 1920s, the fear of Kurdish separatism and political 
                                                 
27 The former text of Article 13 allowed the restriction of rights and liberties on the grounds, inter alia, 
of “safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, 
the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public morals and 
public health.”   
28 Ozan Erözden, Sibel İnceoğlu, Fazıl Sağlam, Sultan Tahmazoğlu, Oktay Uygun (in collaboration 
with Mesut Gülmez, Fikret İlkiz, Ayşe Kollu, Ece Öztan, Nihan Yancı), “National Report: Turkey,” 
Union of Turkish Bar Associations (2004), 8. 
29 For a critique of the amendments for unnecessarily introducing restriction grounds for various rights 
and freedoms, such as the freedom of thought and opinion and the right to fair trial, which are 
guaranteed absolute protection under  the ECHR, see Id., 9. 
30 Law No. 4709, Article 3.  
31 Turkish Constitution, Preamble, para. 5. 
32 On territorial integrity, see e.g. ECtHR, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, Application No: 23144/93, 16 
March 2000; ECtHR, Dicle v. Turkey, Application No. 46733/99, 10 November 2004; ECtHR, United 
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 133/1996/752/951, 1998; ECtHR, 
Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 20/1997/804/1007, 1998. On laicism, see e.g. 
ECtHR, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, Application No. 41340/98, 2003; 
ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Application No.44774/98, 2005. 
33 See Turkish Constitution, Preamble para. 5. 
34 Turkish Constitution, Preamble para. 8. 
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Islam as two fundamental potential threats to the very existence of the nation state has 
shaped the ideological underpinnings of constitutional philosophy, as evident in the 
1982 Constitution. What is most remarkable in the Turkish case is that, the object of 
protection against these imaginary enemies has not been the democratic order, but the 
state itself. So much so that, “in Turkey it is easy to swap the perception of ‘militant 
democracy’ for the perception of ‘militant state’.”35  
 
B. Judicial and non-Judicial Control Mechanisms 
 
The judiciary is the principal institution enforcing the protection of human rights, on 
the basis of a separation of powers between the Constitutional Court and 
administrative courts. However, due to a number of factors including the heavy case 
load of courts, the tendency of the judiciary to prioritize the interests of the state over 
human rights and the lack of a right to petition the Constitutional Court, the judicial 
mechanism proves inadequate to safeguard fundamental rights. As part of the EU 
accession process, various non-judicial institutions have been set up to complement 
the judicial protection mechanism. However, their lack of independence from the 
executive undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of civil society, rendering them 
practically ineffective. The efforts of non-governmental organizations to establish an 
independent national human rights institution have not yet produced a positive result. 
A law enacted in 2006 to establish an independent ombudsperson’s office has not yet 
entered into force due to a presidential veto.  
 
a. Judicial Review of the Protection of Human Rights 
 
Article 40 of the Constitution grants everyone whose rights have been violated the 
right to apply to the “competent authorities” and to receive compensation where the 
subject of unlawful treatment is public officials. While “competent authorities” are 
primarily judicial, the constitutional and legal framework also provides administrative 
and political mechanisms of protection. Article 40(2) requires courts to review human 
rights cases which fall under their jurisdiction and mandate.  
Administrative courts, courts of justice and the Constitutional Court share the 
competence to review human rights cases. Administrative courts have jurisdiction 
over allegations of human rights violations committed by civilian administrative 
authorities.36 The review of complaints against military authorities or relating to 
military service, even if the alleged violations stem from the acts and actions carried 
out by civilian authorities, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Military 
Administrative Court of Appeals.37 The blanket immunity provided for the acts of the 
President on his/her competence,38 the decisions and orders signed by the President on 
his/her initiative,39 the decisions of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public 
                                                 
35 Erözden et al., 2. 
36 Article 125, as amended on 13 August 1999, grants, in paragraph 1, the right to “judicial review 
against all actions and acts of administration.”  
37 Article 157(1). 
38 Article 125(2). 
39 Article 105(2). 
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Prosecutors40 and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors41 is cited as 
a shortcoming from the point of view of rule of law.42  
Pursuant to its duty to review the constitutionality of laws and decrees having 
the force of law, 43 the Constitutional Court is required to ensure that constitutional 
rights and liberties are not violated.44 However, it lacks the power to “review the 
constitutionality of national laws vis-à-vis the European Convention.”45 It is entrusted 
with the annulment of laws upon the application of the President, parliamentary 
groups of the ruling and main opposition parties or one-fifth of the members of the 
parliament.46 The Constitutional Court’s power to review constitutional amendments, 
however, is merely procedural.47 Also vested in the court is the exclusive power to 
dissolve political parties, upon the application of the Chief Public Prosecutor.48 
A fundamental shortcoming of the Turkish constitutional system is that it does 
not vest on individuals the right to petition the Constitutional Court to contest human 
rights violations committed by public agents and institutions. While the issue does not 
rank high on public agenda, relevant bodies have developed proposals for the 
institution of an individual petition mechanism in order to enhance the protection of 
human rights, ease the work load of courts, and reduce the number of petitions filed in 
Strasbourg. Most notably, the Union of Turkish Bars49 and the Constitutional Court50 
advocate the granting of individuals the right to petition the highest court in Turkey.  
 
b. Non-Judicial Human Rights Mechanisms  
 
The Constitution grants individuals the right to petition competent authorities and the 
parliament with “requests and complaints concerning themselves or the public.”51 In 
June 2006, the parliament enacted a law establishing an Ombudsperson to receive 
complaints from natural and legal persons with regards to administrative acts.52 
However, the law has not entered into force due to the President’s veto on the ground 
that the establishment of an institution under the auspices of the parliament which 
would monitor all acts of the administration is contrary to the constitution.53 
In addition, there are various recently established administrative bodies which 
monitor administrative practices from a human rights point of view: the Human 
                                                 
40 Article 159(4). 
41 Article 125(2). 
42 Başbakanlık İnsan Hakları Başkanlığı, İnsan Hakları: Temel Bilgiler, Koruma Mekanizmaları, İl ve 
İlçe İnsan Hakları Kurulları (Matus Basımevi, 2006), 114. 
43 Article 148(1). 
44 Id. 
45 Tuğcu, 5. 
46 Id., Article 148 (2). 
47 Id. “Constitutional amendments shall be examined and verified only with regard to their form.”  
48 Article 69(4): “The dissolution of political parties shall be decided finally by the Constitutional Court 
after the filing of a suit by the office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic.” 
49 The text of the draft constitution proposed by the Union of Turkish Bars on 12 September 2001 
provides, among others, the institution of an individual petition mechanism. Özdemir Özok, “President 
of the Union of Turkish Bars, Opening Address on the Occasion of the Judicial Year of 2005-2006,” 
Ankara, September 2005, 6. 
50 Tuğcu, 2.  
51 Article 74(1). 
52 Kamu Denetçiliği Kanunu (Law on Public Auditing Institution), No. 5521, adopted on 15 June 2006. 
53 For the reasoning of the presidential veto issued on 1 July 2006, see the Presidency’s website at 
http://www.cankaya.gov.tr/tr_html/ACIKLAMALAR/01.07.2006-3512.html. 
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Rights Presidency,54 the Supreme Council of Human Rights,55 the Human Rights 
Advisory Council,56 province and district based human rights boards,57 the Ministry 
of Interior’s Investigation Office58 and the gendarmerie’s Human Rights Violations 
Investigation and Assessment Centre.59 Issues of lack of transparency and expertise of 
these bodies as well the overlap in their mandates aside, these institutions fail to 
constitute effective and legitimate human rights protection mechanisms due to their 
lack of independence from the executive.60 They are extremely under-utilized by 
human rights groups and individuals for lack of faith in their impartiality, 
independence and expertise. A very high profile public dispute that has occurred 
between the Human Rights Presidency and the Human Rights Advisory Council over 
a critical report on minority rights issued by the latter on its own motion served to 
further discredit these bodies. The report’s recommendation for the adoption of a new 
notion of citizenship embracing ethnic and religious differences generated high public 
attention, resulting in the government disowning the report, renouncing its validity 
and launching a criminal investigation against its author and the president of the 
advisory council.61  
The intimidation and prosecution of a member and the president of the Human 
Rights Advisory Council proved the need for an independent national human rights 
institution which should be completely independent from the executive in accordance 
with the Paris Principles of the United Nations.62 However, recent efforts to this end 
                                                 
54 The mandate of the Presidency, which operates under the auspices of the Prime Ministry, is to 
coordinate the works of various human rights bodies, to monitor the implementation of the legal 
framework on human rights, offer recommendations towards harmonizing domestic legal framework 
with international human rights instruments Turkey has ratified, monitor and coordinate the training 
programs of public bodies, review human rights complaints and coordinate efforts for the prevention of 
further violations. Başbakanlık İnsan Hakları Başkanlığı, İnsan Hakları.., 116. 
55 Established in 2001 also under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s office, this body is presided by a 
cabinet minister appointed by the Prime Minister and is made up of undersecretaries belonging to 
various ministries. Its mandate is to draft legal and administrative measures for the protection of human 
rights, make recommendations for the harmonization of the domestic legal framework with 
international law, coordinate efforts for the protection and development of human rights in accordance 
with international standards and monitor the implementation of professional training programs on 
human rights. Id., 116-17.  
56 Established under the auspices of a cabinet ministry, this body provides consultation on human rights 
protection. Its principal task is to issue reports containing recommendations towards that end. Its 
members primarily consist of representatives of human rights organizations, trade unions and 
professional organizations as well as academics. Id., 117.  
57 These bodies receive human rights complaints from individuals.  
58 Established in February 2004, the office receives individual complaints of human rights abuses. 
Ministry of Interior inspectors evaluate and follow up on the applications with relevant authorities. As 
of the end of 2005, only one complaint has resulted in disciplinary action. European Commission 2005 
Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 21. 
59 Established in 2003, the centre, as of the end of 2005, has received 162 complaints most of which 
relate to allegations of ill-treatment or unjust detention. As of the same date, disciplinary action has 
been taken in 3 cases. Id. 
60 In its latest progress report, the European Commission stated that “the Human Rights Presidency 
lacks independence from the government, is understaffed and has a limited budget... The Human 
Rights Advisory Board under the Office of the Prime Minister has not been operating since the 
publication of a report on minority rights in Turkey in October 2004.” European Commission, 2006 
Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 12.  
61 For more on these developments, see Baskın Oran, “‘Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Haklar Raporu’nun 
Bütün Öyküsü,” Birikim, N: 188 (2004), 17-25 . 
62 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1992/54, “Principles Relating to the 
Status of National Institutions,” 3 March 1992. 
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failed to produce concrete results due to the insistence of the government to control 
both the process of the establishment of such an institution and the end result. 
The Turkish Parliament’s Human Rights Investigation Commission provides a 
political mechanism for the protection of human rights. Established in 1990, it is the 
only parliamentary commission established pursuant to a law.63 The Commission has 
the power to set its own agenda and the mandate to conduct human rights monitoring 
on its own initiative, undertake fact-finding missions to locations it deems necessary, 
make unannounced visits to places of detention, interview official and non-official 
individuals and issue non-binding reports based on its missions. Notwithstanding this 
broad mandate, the Commission lacks enforcement power and is not consulted on the 
drafting of human rights legislation. Nonetheless, it plays an active role in receiving 
petitions on human rights violations and undertaking fact-finding missions around the 
country. Between October 2005 and June 2006, the Commission received 864 
applications. In 2006, it conducted several investigations and issued three reports.64 
 
III. Litigating Strasbourg: Case Law, Actors, Implementation, Impact  
 
Turkey is among the state parties most complained against in Strasbourg. With 20,141 
applications lodged between 1 November 1998 and 2006, Turkey ranked sixth among 
the 46 member states following Russia, Poland, Romania, Italy and France.65 In 2006 
alone, 2,280 new applications were lodged against Turkey.66 Of the 1,560 judgments 
that the ECtHR handed down in 2006, the highest number (334) concerned Turkey.67 
As of August 2006, in 196 of these judgments, the Court found Turkey in violation of 
the ECHR.68 As of 1 January 2007, 10% (9,000) of the total number of cases (89,900) 
pending before the ECtHR are those filed against Turkey.69  
Initially, the ECHR’s ratification did not capture much attention in Turkey. 
During the first three decades when the convention was in force, the case law of the 
court consisted mainly of petitions lodged by Cyprus against Turkey’s military 
intervention in and subsequent occupation of the island. There were also cases lodged 
by various European states against the policies and practices of the military junta that 
ruled Turkey between 1980 and 1983. It was only in 1987 when the Turkish 
Government accepted the right of individual petition that the ECHR generated a high 
interest among the public and the media. 1987 carries a further significance for the 
European integration project since that was the year when Turkey put forth a formal 
application for membership to the EU. Since then, thousands of applications have 
been filed in Strasbourg and the ECtHR case law has been a source of both political 
controversy and legal change in Turkey.  
The Kurdish question featured predominantly in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
on Turkey. Majority of applications stemmed from atrocities committed by security 
forces during the state of emergency. Others concerned the dissolution of political 
parties and prosecution of individuals advocating a democratic solution to the Kurdish 
                                                 
63 Sema Pişkinsüt, Türkiye’de İnsan Hakları ve Demokrasi, Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi, Akademi 
Forumu No: 4 (2002), 9. 
64 European Commission, 2006 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 12. 
65 European Court of Human Rights, “Survey of Activities 2006,” Registry of the European Court of 
Human Rights Strasbourg (2007), 43-44. 
66 Id., 40. 
67 
Id., 3. 
68 European Commission, 2006 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 11. 
69 Id., 51. 
  12 
 
question. The constitutional principle of “territorial unity,” or its interpretation by 
courts in Turkey, had provided the doctrinal justification for the infringement of rights 
and freedoms in these cases. The legal and political activism of Kurdish lawyers in 
early 1990s also played a critical role in the high number of petitions. Central to this 
process was the assistance that Kurdish lawyers have received from human rights 
lawyers and organizations in the United Kingdom.  
Another norm that played a key role in the restriction of rights and liberties in 
Turkey is “laicism.” Restrictively interpreting this principle, the Constitutional Court 
dissolved political parties and upheld a headscarf ban in universities. These cases 
were brought to Strasbourg on grounds, among others, of Articles 9 and 11 of the 
ECHR. However, in contrast to its stand vis-à-vis the interpretation of the principle of 
territorial unity, the ECtHR deferred to the Constitutional Court when it came to 
laicism and issued two controversial rulings in Refah Partisi and Leyla Şahin. 
Until recently, Kurds were the only minority group engaged in international 
human rights litigation. However, in doing so, Kurds did not self-identify as a 
“national minority.” While Kurds have in many cases claimed violation of Article 14, 
they alleged that they had been discriminated against on the basis of their ethnic 
origin, not as a national minority per se. This can be explained by the resistance of the 
Kurdish political movement to bear the “minority” tag70 for fear of being associated 
with non-Muslims, the only group granted minority status in Turkey, and thus be 
perceived as lesser citizens.71 At any rate, in scores of Article 14 claims made by 
Kurds, the ECtHR has never found ethnic discrimination.72 Even in applications 
concerning village evictions, where applicants claimed the presence of a systematic 
policy of displacement against the Kurds, the result did not change.73 While the 
ECtHR reviewed Article 14 claims -- and found no violation -- in most cases, it 
declined review in others.74 It has never elaborated why it subjects Article 14 claims 
to such differential treatment.  
 
A. ECtHR Case Law  
 
An analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence on Turkey shows that the legal grounds of 
applications clustered around Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of ill 
treatment, degrading and inhuman punishment and treatment), Article 5 (right to 
                                                 
70 The first public reaction by Kurds to being named as a minority came with the release in October 
2004 of the European Commission’s progress report on Turkey’s accession. The EU’s reference to 
Kurds -- and Alevis -- as a minority was vehemently condemned in various occasions by Kurdish and 
Alevi representatives, who argued instead that Kurds are a “founding people.” European Commission, 
2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 44 and 48. 
71 For a discussion of the historical and political reasons behind Kurds and other ethnic minorities’ 
reluctance to self-identify as minorities and the discrimination and persecution suffered by non-Muslim 
minorities, see Dilek Kurban, “Unravelling a Trade-off: Reconciling Minority Rights and Full 
Citizenship in Turkey,” European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Vol. 4, 2004/5 (2006), 341-371. 
72 The reluctance to review Article 14 applications is not limited to Turkey. ECtHR’s jurisprudence on 
anti-discrimination reveals a general preference, with a few exceptions, to avoid judicial review where 
possible, and to find no violation in rare cases where it conducts such review. For an analysis of the 
court’s jurisprudence on Article 14, see Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, “The Limits of Pluralism- Recent 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Does the Prohibition of Discrimination Add 
Anything?,” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 3 (2002).  
73 See e.g. ECtHR, Akdıvar and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 99/1995/605/693, 30 August 1996; 
ECtHR, Menteş and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 23186/94, 28 November 1997; ECtHR, Hasan 
İlhan v. Turkey, Application No.  22494/93, 9 November 2004.  
74 ECtHR, Orhan v. Turkey, Application No. 25656/94, 18 June 2002. 
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liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect for private and family 
life), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of association), 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 (right to property). Very few cases 
were brought to Strasbourg on the basis of a violation of Article 9 (freedom of 
religion). Notwithstanding the high number of cases where applicants alleged breach 
of Article 14, the ECtHR found violation in only one case concerning gender 
discrimination.75  
The largest number of petitions and judgments that fall within the scope of 
JURISTRAS concerns the restriction of freedom of expression and the criminalization 
of political dissent. Out of 63 petitions filed with the court, 58 resulted in the finding 
of a violation and four in friendly settlements. In only one case, the seminal case of 
Zana, did the court not find a violation of Article 10.76 The vast majority of cases 
concern the prosecution of journalists, human rights advocates and intellectuals for 
expressing dissenting views on the Kurdish question, while a few concerned the 
criminalization of speech criticizing state’s policies on laicism. While some petitions 
raised Article 10 only, most of them raised Article 6 as well.  
The second highest number of petitions and judgments relates to rights 
violations committed by Turkish security forces, particularly in East and Southeast 
Turkey. The articles raised in these cases are Articles 3, 5 and 6. Out of 60 petitions, 
43 resulted in a judgment against Turkey whereas 13 in friendly settlements. While 
the court found no violation in three cases, one petition was declared inadmissible. It 
is important to note here that these petitions are not exhaustive of all applications filed 
in Strasbourg under Articles 3, 5 and 6. Rather, in line with the research methodology 
of JURISTRAS, only the petitions lodged by minorities (in this case, Kurds) are 
reviewed. The identification is based either on explicit information on the ethnic 
origin of the applicants provided in the judgments or on circumstantial inference such 
as the nature of the organization the applicants were accused of being affiliated with 
(in this case, the PKK). Inevitably, this selection may be under-inclusive both because 
the judgments do not uniformly mention the ethnic origin of the petitioners and 
because applicants who were prosecuted for being affiliated with other illegal 
organizations (such as left-wing groupings) may also have been Kurdish.  
The third largest group of cases concerns property rights claims, the vast 
majority of which were filed by Kurds who had been evicted from their villages by 
security forces or were obliged to leave their homes at the height of the armed conflict 
between the PKK and the army. Out of 31 petitions raising property rights abuses, 27 
were filed by Kurdish IDPs whereas the rest were expropriation77 and environmental78 
disputes. The court issued 18 judgments against Turkey and one in favor, while it 
                                                 
75 See Section A-5 titled “Respect for Home, Private and Family Life” below. 
76 ECtHR, Zana v. Turkey, Application No. 69/1996/688/880, 25 November 1997. 
77 ECtHR, Aka v. Turkey, Application No. 107/1997/891/1103, 23 September 1998 (concerning the 
non-payment of the full amount of compensation awarded by authorities to the applicant in return for 
the expropriation of his land for the construction of a dam); ECtHR, Mutlu v. Turkey, Application No. 
8006/02, 20 October 2006 (concerning the non-payment of the full amount of compensation awarded 
by authorities to the applicant in return for the expropriation of his land for the construction of a dam); 
ECtHR, Hasan Kaya v. Turkey, Application No. 33696/02, 21 December 2006 (concerning the 
payment of insufficient interest to the applicant who had been awarded compensation in return for the 
expropriation of his land). 
78 ECtHR, Öneryıldız v. Turkey, Application No. 48939/99, 18 June 2002 (the applicant claimed 
compensation for the non-payment of damages he had been awarded upon the destruction of his house 
and the ensuing death of his family members in an explosion caused by negligent waste disposal by 
authorities). 
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found two applications inadmissible. In 10 cases, all filed by Kurdish IDPs, friendly 
settlements were reached between the parties. While the ECtHR’s judgments in 
expropriation and environmental cases rested solely on Article 1 of the Protocol No. 
1, those concerning internal displacement were based also on Articles 8 and 3.  
The fourth largest group concerns cases regarding the dissolution and 
prosecution of associations and political parties. Out of 11 cases, the court found a 
violation of Article 11 in nine cases, including three cases relating to the dissolution 
of pro-Kurdish political parties, whereas it found no violation in the dissolution of a 
pro-Islamic party in Refah.79  
As stated above, Article 8 was raised in nearly all cases concerning village 
evictions. However, since the primary legal ground relied upon in these cases is 
Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1, they are analyzed under the heading “property rights.” 
In the section under the heading “respect for home, private and family life,” cases 
where applicants relied primarily or solely on Article 8 are reviewed.  
Lastly, the smallest number of cases concerns freedom of religion, which has a 
very low profile in the ECtHR jurisprudence on Turkey. Only two petitions were 
lodged in Strasbourg on the basis primarily of Article 9, and it both cases the ECtHR 
found no violation.80 While the provision was also raised in some cases concerning 
freedom of association, it was not the primary legal ground the applicants relied on.81 
At any rate, the ECtHR declined review under Article 9 in these cases.  
 
1. Freedom of Expression  
 
In nearly all decisions concerning freedom of expression in Turkey, the controversy is 
based on the criminalization of dissenting opinions on the Kurdish question. While 
two judgments concern the prosecution of individuals with Islamic backgrounds who 
expressed critical views on state policies on religion,82 one concerns the prosecution 
of a journalist who published a book criticizing Islam,83 one concerns the conviction 
of a journalist who distributed leaflets about a conscientious objector,84 and two 
concern the suppression of dissenting views by the left through printing a party poster 
containing a slogan against the IMF85 and publishing the bibliography of the founder 
of an extreme left-wing group,86 the rest concerns the prosecution of individuals who 
published materials critical of Turkey’s policies towards the Kurds87 or expressed 
dissenting views on the issue.88 The charges were brought under former Article 312 of 
                                                 
79 ECtHR, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, ECtHR (Grand Chamber). 
80 ECtHR, Kalaç v. Turkey (61/1996/680/870), 23 June 1997; ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey 
(44774/98), 29 June 2004.  
81 See e.g., ECtHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (133/1996/752/951), 30 
January 1998; ECtHR, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey (41340/98), 13 July 
2001. 
82 ECtHR, Erbakan v. Turkey (59405/00), 6 July 2006; ECtHR, Yarar v. Turkey (57258/00), 19 
December 2006. 
83 ECtHR, Aydın Tatlav v. Turkey (50692/99), 2 May 2006. 
84 ECtHR, Düzgören v. Turkey (56827/00), 9 November 2006. 
85 ECtHR, Tüzel v. Turkey (no. 2) (71459/01), 31 October 2006. 
86 ECtHR, Öztürk v. Turkey (22479/93), 28 September 1999. 
87 See e.g. ECtHR, Sürek v. Turkey (24122/94), 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey 
(23927/94), 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey (25067/94), 8 July 1999; ECtHR, 
Erdoğdu v. Turkey (25723/94), 15 June 2000; ECtHR, Şener v. Turkey (26680/95), 18 June 2000. 
88 See e.g. ECtHR, Polat v. Turkey, Application No. 23500/94, 8 June 1999; ECtHR, Karataş v. 
Turkey, Application No. 23168/94, 8 June 1999; ECtHR, Gerger v. Turkey, Application No. 24919/94, 
8 June 1999; ECtHR, Ceylan v. Turkey, Application No. 23556/94, 8 June 1999; ECtHR, Okçuoğlu v. 
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the Penal Code and former Article 8 of the anti-terror law, which criminalized 
separatist propaganda against the unity and integrity of the state as well as incitement 
to hatred and hostility on the basis of race, social class or region. 
In its judgments, the court stressed the essential role that political parties and 
the media play in the proper functioning of democracy, the indispensability of the 
freedom of expression, even where the ideas offend, shock or disturb, the severity of 
bringing the weight of criminal law on opinions, and the incompatibility of state 
security courts whose bench included a military judge with the right to fair trial. The 
only case where the ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 10 is the Zana judgment 
issued by the Grand Chamber.89 In this standard-setting decision, the ECtHR drew the 
boundaries of freedom of expression. The case concerned the conviction of Mehdi 
Zana, a Kurdish politician who was the former mayor of Diyarbakır, the largest 
province populated predominantly by the Kurds. Zana was prosecuted for statements 
he had made during a press interview he gave while he was in prison, where he said 
he supported the “PKK national liberation movement” and that the PKK killed 
women and children “by mistake.” The ECtHR underscored the special circumstances 
of the case owing to the fact that the applicant was a highly influential politician, the 
statements were made at the height of murderous attacks carried out by the PKK on 
civilians in southeast Turkey and the interview was published in a major national 
daily paper. The court regarded the statements as likely to exacerbate an already 
explosive security situation in the region and therefore concluded that the conviction 
of the applicant answered a pressing social need.  
In eight cases, the government reached friendly settlement with the applicants. 
The government admitted in its declarations that “Turkish law and practice urgently 
need to be brought into line with the Convention’s requirements under Article 10” and 
committed itself to undertake the necessary legislative reforms, as outlined in 
Turkey’s national program on accession to the EU.90  
 
2. Cases Brought by Minorities under Articles 3, 5 and 6  
 
The cases analyzed in this section are selected on the basis of the petitions filed by 
minorities under Articles 3, 5 and 6. The vast majority of the petitions were filed by 
Kurds on grounds of human rights abuses committed by security officers during the 
state of emergency. Petitioners had been held in detention for lengthy periods without 
prompt judicial review;91 exposed to ill treatment,92 inhuman and degrading treatment 
and punishment93 or torture;94 or held in unacknowledged detention.95 In many cases, 
                                                                                                                                            
Turkey, Application No. 24246/94, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Incal  v. Turkey, Application No. 
41/1997/825/1031, 8 July 1999. 
89 ECtHR, Zana v. Turkey, Application No. 69/1996/688/880, 25 November 1997. 
90 See e.g. ECtHR, Özler v. Turkey, Application No. 25753/94, 11 July 2002.  
91 See e.g. ECtHR, Aksoy  v. Turkey, Application No. 21987/93, 18 December 1996. 
92 See e.g. ECtHR, Mehmet Emin Yüksel  v. Turkey, Application No. 40154/98, 20 October 2004; 
ECtHR, Çelik and İmret  v. Turkey, Application No. 44093/98, 26 October 2004. 
93 See e.g. ECtHR, Timurtaş v. Turkey, Application No. 23531/94, 13 June 2000; ECtHR, Taş v. Turkey 
Application no. 24396/94, 14 November 2000. 
94 See e.g. ECtHR, Salman  v. Turkey, Application No. 21986/93, 27 June 2000; ECtHR, İlhan  v. 
Turkey, Application No. 22277/93, 27 June 2000; ECtHR, Akkoç v. Turkey, Application No. 22947/93, 
22948/93, 10 October 2000. 
95 See e.g. ECtHR, Kurt v. Turkey, Application No. 15/1997/799/1002, 25 May 1998; ECtHR, Çakıcı v. 
Turkey, Application No. 23657/94, 8 July 1999; ECtHR, Timurtaş  v. Turkey, Application No. 
23531/94, 13 June 2000; ECtHR, Taş v. Turkey, Application No. 24396/94, 14 November 2000; 
ECtHR, Çiçek  v. Turkey, Application No. 25704/94, 27 February 2001. 
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the applicants were also convicted by state security courts, whose benches at the time 
included a military judge along with two civilian judges.96 While petitioners raised 
Article 14 in some cases,97 the Court did not examine these claims in most instances 
and found no violation in rare cases where it did.98    
The court established standards on the safeguards that need to be followed 
during detention and trial. In Kurt, it held that the unacknowledged detention of an 
individual is a complete negation of the guarantees under Article 3 and a violation of 
Article 5.99 Öcalan concerned the abduction of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, in 
Kenya and his trial in Turkey which resulted in his sentencing to death penalty by a 
state security court. In this case, the ECtHR held that the applicant’s trial and 
conviction by a court lacking independence and impartiality, lack of legal assistance 
for seven days, inability to communicate with his counsel in confidence and lack of 
appropriate access to the case file, as well as the restriction on the number and length 
of meetings he had with his lawyers violated his rights under Article 6.  
In 13 cases, the parties reached friendly settlement. In its declarations of 
friendly settlement, the government expressed regret about “the occurrence of 
individual cases” of ill treatment and torture, expressed a firm commitment to issue 
appropriate instructions and adopt all necessary measures to ensure that effective 
investigations are carried out, and noted that new legal and administrative measures 
had been adopted towards that end.100  
 
3. Property Rights  
 
A state of emergency was declared in 1987 in Kurdish-populated East and Southeast 
Turkey, granting extra-legal powers to administrative and military authorities in the 
region.101 Human rights abuses committed by security forces in late 1980s and early 
1990s led to a rapid increase in the number of petitions filed in Strasbourg. According 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the nearly 3,000 applications filed as of August 
2003,102 1,500 related to allegations of forced eviction and property destruction.  
Instrumental in the high number of petitions has been the exception made by 
the ECtHR in Akdıvar and Others to the principle of the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies in applications originating from the region.103 The case concerned 
allegations by Kurdish civilians that they had been evicted from their homes by 
security forces in violation, inter alia, of their rights to property. The ECtHR 
developed the following exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion of domestic legal 
remedies under Article 26: 1) the insufficiency or inefficiency of remedies available 
in member country’s domestic legislation; or 2) the demonstration of the existence of 
an administrative practice condoned by official authorities, where actions in violation 
of the ECHR recur continuously, rendering domestic remedies ineffective or 
                                                 
96 See e.g. ECtHR, Algür v. Turkey, Application No. 32574/96, 22 October 2002; ECtHR, Öcalan v. 
Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, 12 March 2003. 
97 See e.g. ECtHR, Öcalan  v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, 12 March 2003. 
98 See e.g. ECtHR, İpek  v. Turkey, Application No. 25760/94, 17 February 2004. 
99 ECtHR, Kurt v. Turkey, Application No. 15/1997/799/1002, 25 May 1998. 
100 See e.g. ECtHR, Yakar v. Turkey, Application No. 36189/97, 26 November 2002. 
101 Originally in force in a few provinces, the state of emergency was progressively expanded to cover 
12 provinces. It was gradually abolished after 1999 and came to a complete end in 2002. 
102 Durmuş Tezcan, Mustafa Ruhan Erdem, Oğuz Sancakdar, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi 
Işığında Türkiye’nin İnsan Hakları Sorunu (2004), 168, citing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy 
General Directorate on Council of Europe and Human Rights. 
103 ECtHR, Akdıvar and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 99/1995/605/693 (1996). 
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insufficient. Implementing this principle in the context of Turkey, ECtHR pointed out 
that despite the gravity of village destructions and the multitude of claims of 
intentional destruction of property by security forces, the government had not been 
able to provide a domestic legal remedy to compensate villagers for damages arising 
from these violations or to hold the security forces accountable.  
27 applications were lodged against property destruction and forced eviction. 
Petitioners based their claims primarily on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and 
Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1. Initially, ECtHR did not deem it necessary to review 
claims under Article 3.104 However, in subsequent cases, it held that the intentional 
burning of property before the eyes of the IDPs constituted inhuman treatment.105 The 
applicants also alleged that the state had a discriminatory policy of forced 
displacement targeting the Kurdish population. However, the court held that Article 
14 was not violated.106 In rare cases it declined review altogether.107  
Until Doğan and Others,108 the court had limited its ruling to the individual 
case before it. In this case, the ECtHR identified a structural problem of internal 
displacement and called on the government to design policies towards its solution.109 
Plaintiffs claimed that they were not permitted to return to their village and access 
their property even after 1999, when the government’s “Return to Village and 
Rehabilitation Project” (RVRP) had entered into force. The ECtHR held that the 
government’s return policy has failed, the measures it has taken to improve the 
conditions of IDPs were insufficient and ineffective, and that “effective legal remedy” 
requires not only the payment of compensation, but also the identification and 
punishment of perpetrators. The government pointed out that a draft law on 
compensation was being deliberated at the Turkish Parliament, but the ECtHR 
declined to take into account a law that had not yet come into force. In İçyer judgment 
of 12 February 2006, the court held that the Compensation Law, which had entered 
into force on October 2004,110 was an effective remedy for IDPs and ruled the 
application inadmissible.  
One recent decision worth mentioning here is the case of Fener Rum Lisesi 
Vakfı.111 The first judgment ever in a case brought by a non-Muslim minority in 
Turkey, the case concerns the confiscation by the state of a property belonging to a 
Rum Orthodox foundation on the basis of a discriminatory policy dating back to 
1960s. In this precedent-setting judgment where the ECtHR for the first time ruled on 
Turkey’s policies on the property rights of non-Muslim foundations, the court found a 
violation of Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 and gave the government three months to 
either return the property or pay just compensation.  
                                                 
104 ECtHR, Akdıvar and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 99/1995/605/693, 30 August 1996; ECtHR, 
Menteş and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 23186/94, 28 November 1997. 
105 See e.g. ECtHR, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, Application No. 12/1997/796/998-999, 24 April 1998. 
106 See e.g. ECtHR, Akdıvar and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 99/1995/605/693, 30 August 1996; 
ECtHR, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, Application No. 12/1997/796/998-999, 24 April 1998. 
107 See e.g. ECtHR, Orhan v. Turkey, Application No. 25656/94, 18 June 2002. 
108 ECtHR, Doğan and Others v. Turkey Application Nos. 8803-8811/02, 8813/02 and 8815-8819/02, 
29 June 2004. 
109 This change in heart is mainly due to the new mandate granted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. In a decision on 12 May 2004, the Committee of Ministers authorized ECtHR to 
issue pilot judgments where it identifies a structural problem in a member state. The main reason for 
the new strategy was to ease the case load of the court. Decision No. 2004/3.  
110 Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Kanun [Law on 
Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism], No. 5233, 17 July 
2004, Official Gazette No. 25535, 27 July 2004 (“Compensation Law”). 
111 ECtHR, Fener Rum Lisesi Vakfı v. Turkey, Application No. 34478/97, 9 January 2007. 
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4. Freedom of Association 
 
The most important group of cases here is the decisions concerning political party 
dissolutions,112 four of which resulted in a finding of violation whereas in Refah 
Partisi the ECtHR ruled in favour of the government. While the earlier cases 
concerned the dissolution of pro-Kurdish parties in the name of national unity and 
territorial integrity, Refah Partisi concerned the closure of a pro-Islamist party in the 
name of laicism.  
In Socialist Party and United Communist Party of Turkey, the ECtHR 
established important standards on freedom of association: The dissolution of a party 
solely on the basis of its program, before it had any chance to engage in activities, 
infringes on Article 11;113 a party’s choice of name cannot justify a measure as drastic 
as dissolution;114 that the program of a party seeks to achieve goals, such as the 
establishment of a federal regime, which are considered to be incompatible with 
constitutional principles does not make it incompatible with democracy. A party can 
advocate any political goal which does not harm democracy itself.115  
In Refah Partisi, the ECtHR drew the boundaries of freedom of association. It 
concluded that the party constituted a serious threat to the secular regime in Turkey, 
justifying its dissolution in the name of protection of democracy. Thus, the ECtHR 
gave a very rare judgment in its overall jurisprudence, upholding the dissolution of an 
entire political party that had been a part of the political system for 15 and the 
government for two years. It is notable that, unlike in previous dissolution decisions 
by the Turkish Constitutional Court, the basis of this infringement was not the 
program or the acts of the party itself, but various statements made by its chairman 
and members over the course of years. The ECtHR ruled that, the aspirations 
expressed by these individuals for a plurality of legal systems and a government based 
on Islamic law, the achievement of which were possible in light of Turkey’s history, 
were incompatible with democracy. In doing so, the ECtHR contradicted with its own 
judgment in United Communist Party where it had ruled that the dissolution of a party 
on the basis of its program and in the absence of any specific acts aimed at 
overthrowing the democratic regime was contrary to freedom of association.   
 
5. Respect for Home, Private and Family Life 
 
There are six ECtHR decisions concerning privacy rights, where petitioners relied 
solely on Article 8, concerning forced gynecological examination,116 the inability of 
married women to use their maiden names,117 operation of gold mines on residential 
                                                 
112 ECtHR, Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 20/1997/804/1007, 25 May 1998; 
ECtHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turke, Application No. 133/1996/752/951, 
30 January 1998;ECtHR, Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey, Application No. 
23885/94, 12 August 1999; ECtHR, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey (Grand 
Chamber) , Application No. 41340/98, 13 February 2003; ECtHR, Emek Partisi and Şenol v. Turkey, 
Application No. 39434/98, 31 May 2005. 
113 ECtHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey , para. 58. 
114 Id. 
115 ECtHR, Socialist Party and Others v. Turk, 47. 
116 ECtHR, Y.F. v. Turkey, Application No. 24209/94, 22 July 2003 (concerning the forced 
gynaecological examination of a female detainee of Kurdish origin who was accused of aiding and 
abetting PKK) 
117 ECtHR, Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, Application No. 29865/96, 16 November 2004. 
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areas,118 incommunicado detention without notification of families,119 unlawful search 
and seizure,120 and paternity dispute.121 The earliest judgment is dated July 2003.    
Ünal Tekeli is the only judgment in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Turkey 
where the court found a violation of Article 14. The case was lodged by a female 
lawyer who challenged a domestic law requiring married women to use both their 
maiden name and their husband’s last name on official documents. She sought release 
to use only her maiden name on the ground that she was known by the latter in her 
professional life. Noting that Turkey is the only country within the Council of Europe 
which imposes the husband’s name as the couple’s surname, even where the couple 
prefers an alternative arrangement, the ECtHR found the differential treatment of 
married men and married women to constitute gender discrimination.  
 
6. Freedom of Religion 
 
To this date, the ECtHR issued judgment in only two cases where applicants relied 
primarily on Article 9. Kalaç concerned the compulsory retirement of a military judge 
pursuant to the order of the Supreme Military Council on the ground that his religious 
activities showed lack of loyalty to the principle of secularism.122 In Leyla Şahin, the 
issue was the compatibility of an administrative ban on the wearing of headscarf at 
universities, which caused the applicant who refused to take off her headscarf to be 
expelled from medical school. In both cases, the ECtHR did not find a violation.123 In 
Kalaç, the court reasoned that the system of military discipline, to which the applicant 
voluntarily subjected himself, implied restrictions incapable of being imposed on 
civilians. The Supreme Military Council’s order was a disciplinary measure which 
was not based on the applicant’s beliefs. In Leyla Şahin, the court based its decision 
on the rights of female university students who chose not to wear the scarf but could 
feel intimidated by the presence on campus of women wearing headscarves. The 
ECtHR also found that the ban was justified by the legitimate concern to maintain 
public order in a secular country which is subject to the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
The fact that freedom of religion is an under-litigated area in the ECtHR’s 
case law on Turkey is due to the fact that minorities have until recently been reluctant 
to take their claims to Strasbourg.124 However, this has started to change very recently 
                                                 
118 ECtHR, Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 46117/99, 30 March 2005 (concerning a 
petition by a group of villagers contesting the authorities’ granting of permits to international gold 
companies to operate mines on their lands). 
119 ECtHR, Sarı and Çolak v. Turkey, Application No. 42596/98 and 42603/98, 14 March 2006 
(concerning the incommunicado detention of applicants for seven days during which time they were 
not allowed to contact their families). 
120 ECtHR, Taner Kılıç  v. Turkey, Application No. 70845/01, 24 October 2006 (concerning the 
unlawful search of the house of a human rights defender and the seizure of his belongings). 
121 ECtHR, Tavlı v. Turkey, Application No. 11449/02, 9 November 2006 (concerning the application 
by a man who contested his paternity of a child born in wedlock).  
122 ECtHR, Kalaç v. Turkey, Application No. 61/1996/680/870, 23 June 1997. 
123 ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, 29 June 2004. 
124 For a discussion of the reasons of the reluctance of Alevis in this regard, see Aykan Erdemir, 
Incorporating Alevis: The Transformation of Governance and Faith-Based Collective Action in Turkey, 
thesis presented in the subject of Anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University (April 
2004), 214-221. 
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with various religious minorities filing cases with the ECtHR. Currently, applications 
lodged by Alevi125 and Protestant126 minorities are pending before the court.  
On the other hand, the disillusionment caused by the ECtHR’s ruling in the 
case of Leyla Şahin, where the court showed an unquestionable deference to the 
Turkish Constitutional Court’s interpretation of secularism, may discourage members 
of the Sunni Muslim majority from petitioning Strasbourg. The lack of faith in the 
ECtHR may be among the reasons for the Fazilet Party’s withdrawal of its 
application, where it had challenged its dissolution on the ground of Article 11.127 
 
B. National and International Actors Advocating Minority Rights 
 
Kurdish lawyers and activists played an instrumental role in the construction of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence on Turkey. When national remedies were de facto inaccessible 
under the state of emergency regime, Kurdish lawyers sought justice in Strasbourg. 
Lawyers associated with the bar associations of Diyarbakır and Istanbul, the Istanbul-
based Foundation on Social and Legal Studies (Toplumsal ve Hukuk Araştırmaları 
Vakfı-TOHAV), Human Rights Association and the Human Rights Foundation of 
Turkey became the pioneers of litigating in Strasbourg and developed an expertise in 
this regard. In this process, they developed a close cooperation with lawyers in 
Europe, particularly those affiliated with the Human Rights Centre at University of 
Essex and the Kurdish Human Rights Project, both in the United Kingdom. British 
lawyers associated with these organizations filed scores of petitions, alone or in 
cooperation with Kurdish lawyers. 
Turkey’s EU accession process has been instrumental in not only 
strengthening the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on minority protection, but also 
encouraging new minority groups to litigate for the protection of their religious rights 
and the right to be free from discrimination. With recent reforms, both the nature of 
claims and the identity of applicants have started to diversify: minorities now seek 
relief against discrimination in education and for effective political participation, the 
protection of religious freedoms and the right to education. This is evident, for 
example, in the petitions filed by Armenian and Rum Orthodox minorities for the 
return of their properties or the payment of just compensation, by Protestants and 
Presbyterians for the recognition of their religion and the granting of authorization for 
registry of their churches, and by Alevis for the abolishment of compulsory religion 
classes in schools.128 National and international external actors assisting minority 
groups in Turkey in their litigation efforts have started to diversify as well. 
Noteworthy in this regard are religious associations such as the Alevi “Pir Sultan 
Abdal Culture Association” in Turkey and the Europe based “Confederation of the 
                                                 
125 In a petition filed in January 2004, an Alevi parent challenged the compatibility of the compulsory 
religious instruction in primary and secondary schools on the ground that it was based on the Sunni 
interpretation of Islam, did not reflect Alevis’ perception of this religion and was thus discriminatory, 
and in violation of Alevis’ freedom of religion. Erdemir, Incorporating Alevis…, 202-204. 
126 In March 2001, two Protestants who were arrested for publishing and distributing books about 
Christianity lodged a complaint with the ECtHR under, among others, Article 9. ECtHR, Şengül Aydın 
v. Turkey. In another case filed in December 2002, applicants are Turkish citizens of Protestant faith, 
who contested the rejection of their application to register their church on the ground that this violated 
their freedom of religion. ECtHR, Özbek and Others v. Turkey. 
127 ECtHR, Fazilet Partisi and Kutan v. Turkey, Application No. 1444/02, 27 April 2006. 
128 While religion classes are mandatory for all students in primary and secondary education, non-
Muslim students are granted leave in practice. Alevis are not allowed to benefit from this exception. 
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European Alevi Unions” which have been instrumental in an Alevi parent’s 
application regarding compulsory religious instruction.   
Since early 1990s, various international actors have been actively involved in 
non-litigation based human rights advocacy on behalf of the Kurds. Most notably, 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 
the US Committee for Refugees, the European Parliament and European governments 
have been critical in bringing the Kurdish question to the attention of the international 
community. In the last decade, the EU accession process has brought to the fore a new 
international actor: the European Commission in Brussels and its delegation office in 
Ankara. The annual progress reports of the European Commission have become the 
principal assessment tool for the advancement of human rights protection in Turkey. 
At the national level, various human rights groups such as those named above have 
played a critical role in documenting human rights abuses committed during the state 
of emergency and raising awareness on the plight of the Kurds. Today, these groups 
work in close cooperation with the European Commission through providing the latter 
with information for its annual progress reports.  
 
C. Strategic Litigation 
 
One of the key research questions of JURISTRAS is whether applicants petitioning 
the ECtHR do so merely to gain an individual remedy or whether they are also 
motivated by the larger goal of pressuring the authorities to take remedial measures of 
a general nature. In other words, does the ECtHR have a central place in the domestic 
efforts to bring political change through litigation?     
In the Turkish case, the number of isolated petitions which vary based on the 
special circumstances of the applicant is quite marginal. With the exception of a few 
number of case concerning land expropriation,129 environmental issues,130 paternity 
dispute131 and gender equality132 where applicants sought individual remedy, the vast 
majority of petitions were brought by Kurds or parties advocating their rights. The 
combination of various factors -- the coinciding of Turkey’s acceptance of the right to 
individual petition with the declaration of state of emergency, the unwillingness of 
domestic courts to exercise jurisdiction over allegations of human rights abuses 
committed under this regime, the ECtHR’s development of the “Akdıvar exception” to 
the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies -- resulted in a massive flow of petitions 
filed by Kurds in Strasbourg. Consequently, the ECtHR has become associated in the 
minds of both the state and the society with the Kurdish question. One question that 
JURISTRAS may find worth exploring is to what extent the ECtHR is perceived by 
the public opinion in Turkey to be a political rather than a legal body and whether it is 
seen as an independent and impartial institution. 
Although the Kurds have been engaged in strategic litigation since early 
1990s, their claims clustered around rights to property, liberty, fair trial and the right 
to be free from torture rather than challenging Turkey’s minority policy. However, as 
previously stated, both the identity of applicants and the nature of claims have started 
to diversify in recent years. New minority groups -- such as Alevis, Protestants, 
                                                 
129 See e.g. ECtHR, Aka v. Turkey, Application No. 107/1997/891/1103, 23 September 1998; ECtHR, 
Mutlu v. Turkey, Application No. 8006/02, 20 December 2006. 
130 ECtHR, Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 46117/99, 30 March 2005; ECtHR, 
Öneryıldız v. Turkey, Application No. 48939/99, 18 June 2002.  
131 ECtHR, Tavlı v. Turkey, Application No. 11449/02, 9 November 2006.  
132 ECtHR, Ünal Tekeli v. Turkey, Application No. 29865/96, 16 November 2004.  
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Armenians and Rums – have started to bring their claims to Strasbourg. What is 
contested in these applications is effectively Turkey’s exclusive citizenship concept 
and discriminatory policies against minorities. The controversy at issue in the pending 
case concerning the petition of an Alevi parent against compulsory religious classes in 
primary and secondary schools is the non-secular nature of state-religion relationship 
in Turkey. What is at stake in the recently issued judgment concerning the return of its 
confiscated properties to a Rum Orthodox foundation is Turkey’s discriminatory 
policies against non-Muslims.133 These cases bear a high significance for the research 
question of JURISTRAS in that they signify the first time that an Alevi and a Rum 
citizen has petitioned the ECtHR. They point to an increasing resort by various 
minority groups to Strasbourg when prior domestic political and legal efforts to 
change the discriminatory aspects of the national legal framework have failed.  
As new minority groups seek political change through litigation, however, the 
Kurds and the Muslims are losing faith in the reliability of the ECtHR as an external 
actor in their political struggle in Turkey. The İçyer,134 Refah135 and Şahin136 
judgments have cost the ECtHR considerable legitimacy in the eyes of the Kurds and 
the Muslims, who voice their frustration and disillusionment with what they 
increasingly perceive to be a political court. To what extent this perception may 
influence these groups’ future efforts to litigate in Strasbourg may be a question worth 
exploring in the later stages of JURISTRAS. 
 
D. Domestic Execution of Judgments 
 
As a state party to the ECHR, Turkey is under an obligation to secure everyone within 
its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR137 and “to abide by the 
final judgment of the Court.”138 This confers on judicial, political and executive 
authorities the responsibility to execute ECtHR’s judgments through means they deem 
to be appropriate. Article 13 guarantees the availability of a national remedy to 
enforce the rights and freedoms granted under the ECHR. While Turkey, as all other 
states parties, has some discretion as to the manner in which it conforms to its Article 
13 obligations, the remedy must be “effective” in practice as well as in law.139  
In its judgments in the village eviction and property destruction cases, the 
ECtHR has noted that the nature and gravity of violations had implications for 
Article 13.140 In Menteş and Others, the Court stressed that “where an individual has 
an arguable claim that his or her home and possessions have been purposely destroyed 
by agents of the State, the notion of an ‘effective remedy’ entails, in addition to the 
payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation 
                                                 
133 ECtHR, Fener Rum Lisesi Vakfı v. Turkey, Application No. 34478/97, 9 January 2007. 
134 For critical reflections of the İçyer judgment in Kurdish media, see e.g. Hasip Kaplan, “Pis 
Kokular,” Gündem, 5 October 2006.  
135 For critical reflections of the Refah judgment in pro-Islamic media, see e.g. “Türkiye’ye Özgü 
Karar,” Yeni Şafak, 1 August 2001; “Yolumuza Devam Ederiz,” Yeni Şafak, 1 August 2001; Cengiz 
Çandar, “AİHM’nin Refah Kararını Nasıl Okumalı?,” Yeni Şafak, 1 August 2001; “Erdoğan da 
Tepkili,” Zaman, 1 August 2001; Erhan Başyurt, “AİHM’den Şüpheli Karar,” Zaman, 1 August 2001.   
136 For critical reflections of the Şahin judgment in pro-Islamic media, see e.g. “AİHM İhlali,” Yeni 
Şafak, 11 November 2005; Fehmi Koru, “Kararın Anlamı” Yeni Şafak, 11 November  2005; “AİHM 
İhlali,”Yeni Şafak, 11 November 2005; Ahmet Kekeç, “AİHM Sınıfta Kaldı!” Yeni Şafak, 11 
November 2005. 
137 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Article 1. 
138 Article 46. 
139 ECtHR, Menteş and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 23186/94, 28 November 1997, para. 89. 
140 ECtHR, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, Application No. 12/1997/796/998-999, 24 April 1998, para. 96. 
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capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible.”141 In 
Selçuk and Asker, the Court also noted that “a judgment in which it finds a breach 
imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and 
make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the 
situation existing before the breach (restitutio in integrum).”142  However, added the 
Court, “if restitutio in integrum is in practice impossible, the respondent States are 
free to choose the means whereby they comply with a judgment in which the Court 
has found a breach, and the Court will not make consequential orders or declaratory 
statements in this regard.”143 Thereby, in this and all other similar cases, the ECtHR 
declined the applicants’ request for declaratory judgment, deferring instead to the 
Committee of Ministers’ authority to supervise compliance. 
Since 1999, the Committee of Ministers has closely supervised Turkey’s 
execution of the ECtHR’s judgments. Such supervision particularly focused on 
judgments where security forces were found to have committed torture, inhuman 
treatment, destruction of property, illegal killings and disappearances. Towards 
executing these judgments, the Turkish Government took a series of general 
measures, which served not only to comply with Turkey’s legal duties under Article 
46 of the ECHR but also to fulfill its political commitments to the EU. These 
measures concentrated on four main areas, as called upon by the Committee of 
Ministers: 1) education and training of members of the security forces; 2) reform of 
the criminal justice system; 3) compensating victims; and 4) training of prosecutors 
and judges.144 The government undertook, inter alia, the following legislative 
measures: giving direct effect to the ECHR, lifting the state of emergency, abolishing 
state security courts, introducing procedural safeguards for persons held in police 
custody (such as granting detainees the rights to see a lawyer of their own choosing 
from the outset of detention, to free legal assistance, to a medical examination without 
the presence of security forces; and authorizing prosecutors to control detention 
premises and have access to custody records), establishing the Turkish Academy of 
Justice for the education of judges and prosecutors; establishing a Staff Education and 
Training Unit to deal with the training of staff in prisons and detention centers, 
enhancing the accountability of security forces (through introducing minimum prison 
sentences for crimes of ill treatment and torture which may not be converted to fines 
or suspended, abolishing the requirement of administrative authorization for criminal 
investigations against security forces accused of these crimes).145      
Legal reforms alone, no matter how groundbreaking they are, fail to guarantee 
the effective protection of human rights. The unprecedented efforts by the legislative 
and executive in Turkey to adopt constitutional and legislative reforms have been 
undermined by a resilient bureaucracy who significantly curtailed the rights and 
freedoms granted under new laws. To overcome this bureaucratic resistance, the 
government adopted a series of executive measures under the supervision of the 
Committee of Ministers. To ensure that administrative and judicial authorities comply 
with the ECtHR judgments, these measures took the form of executive circulars 
                                                 
141 ECtHR, Menteş and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 23186/94, 28 November 1997, para. 89. 
142 ECtHR, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, Application No. 12/1997/796/998-999, 24 April 1998, para. 
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143 Id. 
144 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution Res DH(99)434 concerning general measures to ensure 
compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases against Turkey 
concerning actions of the security forces, 9 June 1999.  
145 See generally the interim resolutions of the Committee of Ministers. 
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addressed to prosecutors and judges,146 law enforcement officers and provincial 
governors;147 and human rights training for educators,148 police and gendarmerie,149 
judges, prosecutors and lawyers.150 The Council of Europe and the EU have been 
actively involved in the human rights training programs.  
The Committee of Ministers has closely monitored the execution of judgments 
on fair trial, where the government took both individual and general measures. In 
Sadak, Zana, Dicle and Doğan, a new law that entered into force on 4 February 2003 
allowed the applicants’ retrial and release pending trial.151 In Öcalan, the applicant 
was paid just satisfaction and his request for a retrial was examined on the merits. 
However, the request was rejected by a court on the grounds that the nature of the 
crime and the evidence would lead to the same outcome, i.e. sentencing to life 
imprisonment.152 A series of general measures were also adopted to prevent similar 
violations in the future. Death penalty in peacetime was abolished on 9 August 2002. 
An amendment to the penal code which came into effect on 1 June 2005 provides 
detainees the right to see a judge within 24 hours of their detention in regular cases 
and three days in exceptional cases, the right to a lawyer in cases with a minimum of 
5 years and the right to correspond with a lawyer in confidentiality and without time 
                                                 
146 See e.g. The Circulars of the Ministry of Justice to law enforcement officers, 28 May and 22 August 
2002; The Circular of the Ministry of Justice to public prosecutors, 20 October 2003; The Circular of 
the Ministry of Justice to judges and prosecutors, 1 June 2005; The Circular of the Ministry of Justice 
to judges and prosecutors, January 2006 (instructing them to take into consideration the ECHR’s 
standards on freedom of expression). See generally the interim resolutions of the Committee of 
Ministers. 
147 See e.g. The Circular of the Ministry of Interior to the police and gendarmerie, 20 December 1999; 
the Circular of the Minister of Interior to all security personnel, 24 July 2001; the Circular of the 
Minister of Interior to all provincial governors and the gendarmerie, 16 January 2003; the Circular of 
the Minister of Interior to local authorities, 18 October 2004. See generally the interim resolutions of 
the Committee of Ministers. 
148 The Human Rights Education Program of Turkey initiated by the Ministry of Education in 1998 
introduced human rights education into the curricula of primary and secondary education. Batuhan 
Aydagül, "The Impact of the ECHR on Rights In and To Education in Turkey," in Jan De Groof and 
Gracienne Lauwers (eds.), No Person Shall Be Denied The Right to Education: The Influence of the 
European Convention on Human Rights on The Rights To Education and Rights In Education (Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2004), 532. 
149 The Turkish Government participated in the Council of Europe project called “Police and Human 
Rights 1997-2000, which aimed at reorganising the content of the basic and in-service training of the 
police. Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution ResDH (2002)98, concerning general measures to 
ensure compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases against 
Turkey concerning actions of the security forces, 10 July 2002. 
150 Within the framework of “Council of Europe/European Commission Joint Initiative,” practice-based 
human rights training was given to prosecutors, judges and lawyers on the ECHR and the application of 
the ECtHR’s case law. Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution ResDH (2005)43, concerning 
general measures to ensure compliance with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in 
the cases against Turkey concerning actions of members of the security forces, 7 June 2005. The 
Ministry of Justice also organized regular training activities within the context of “Human Rights 
Education in Turkey Program 1998-2007” for in-service training of judges and prosecutors. Committee 
of Ministers, Interim Resolution ResDH (2006)966, concerning general measures to ensure compliance 
with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases against Turkey concerning 
actions of the security forces, 6-7 June 2006. 
151 Committee of Ministers, Final Resolution ResDH (2004)86 concerning the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 17 July 2001 in the case of Sadak, Zana, Dicle and Doğan against 
Turkey, 9 December 2004. 
152 Committee of Ministers, Resolution ResDH (2007)1 concerning execution of the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Öcalan against Turkey of 12 May 2005, 14 February 
2007. 
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restrictions.153 A further general measure aimed at executing these, as well as several 
other, judgments is the replacement in 1999 of the military judge in state security 
courts by a civil judge and the abolishment of state security courts in 2004.154  
The August 2002155 and January 2003156 reform packages granted individuals 
whose Article 6 rights had been violated the right of retrial. On the basis of Law no. 
4793 amending the Civil Procedures Act and Criminal Procedures Act, they were now 
allowed to seek the re-opening of domestic proceedings in all cases which had been 
decided by the ECtHR and in all new cases which would be brought before the 
Strasbourg court after the law’s date of entry.157 Law No. 4928 extended this right to 
the final judgments of administrative courts.158  
Pursuant to this general measure, one of the most high-profile cases where the 
ECtHR had found a violation of Article 6 in the conviction and imprisonment of 
former Kurdish members of the parliament was reopened.159 On 28 February 2003, 
the state security court accepted the applicants’ request for retrial, but upheld their 
initial conviction on 21 April 2004. In response to the pressure exerted by the 
Committee of Ministers160 and the European Commission, Turkish authorities took 
one of the most significant individual measures in executing the ECtHR judgments. In 
a decision on 9 June 2004, the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the state 
security court on the basis of the ECtHR’s judgment, suspending the execution of the 
sentence and ordering the release of the applicants. The Committee of Ministers 
declared that Turkey has exercised its functions under Article 46.161 
Freedom of expression is another area where general measures were adopted. 
A law dated 6 February 2002 amended Article 312 of the Penal Code, introducing the 
criterion of “incitement in a manner which is explicitly dangerous to public order” for 
prosecution of speech. In the friendly settlement reached in Tanıyan, the government 
undertook to “ensure that the amended Article 312 will be applied in accordance with 
the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention as interpreted in the Court's case-
law.”162 An amendment to Article 159 of the Penal Code on 3 August 2002 lifted 
penalties for the expression of thoughts that are merely critical in nature. A law dated 
19 July 2003 repealed Article 8 of the anti-terror law, which had prohibited 
propaganda, assemblies and demonstrations aimed at undermining territorial integrity. 
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154 Id. See also Committee of Ministers, Final Resolution ResDH (2004)86 concerning the judgment of 
the European Court of Human Rights of 17 July 2001 in the case of Sadak, Zana, Dicle and Doğan 
against Turkey, 9 December 2004. 
155 Law on the Amendment of Various Laws, No. 4771, adopted on 3 August 2002, entered into force 
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The Law on Associations was amended on 2 January 2003, limiting the requirement 
that associations use only Turkish in their official correspondence.163  
While Turkey has made significant progress in executing the ECtHR case law, 
as of 2006, cases against Turkey still represented 14.4% of the judgments pending 
before the Committee of Ministers.164 Of these, 93 relate to effective remedies against 
abuses by security forces and 115 to freedom of expression.165  
 
IV. Literature Review 
 
The European Commission’s emphasis in its reports on Turkey’s execution of the 
ECtHR judgments166 as well as the Turkish Parliament’s reference to both fulfilling 
the EU accession conditionality and executing the ECtHR case law in justifying the 
legislative purposes of some reform laws167 show that the EU accession process and 
the ECtHR case law play an interdependent role in facilitating the harmonization of 
national law with European norms. And yet, the literature on these two phenomena 
has so far developed independently of each other. There is no literature on the 
relevance of the EU accession process for the alignment of Turkey’s legal framework 
with the ECtHR jurisprudence. 
 
A. Literature Review on the EU Accession Process and the ECtHR Case Law  
 
There is ample domestic academic literature in Turkey on the protection of human 
rights under the ECHR168 and on the ECtHR jurisprudence.169 There are also studies 
focusing on the protection of selected rights and liberties under the ECHR, such as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and religious freedom.170 More 
specifically, the relationship between the ECHR and the Turkish legal order171 and the 
ECtHR’s case law on Turkey has been the object of academic research, particularly in 
                                                 
163 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution ResDH (2004)38, “Freedom of Expression cases 
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(1960-1994)”, İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, İstanbul (1999);  
170 See e.g. Güney Dinç, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’ne Göre İnanç, Anlatım ve Örgütlenme 
Özgürlükleri,” İzmir Barosu Yayınları, İzmir (2005); Bekir Berat Özipek (der.), “Teorik ve Pratik 
Boyutlarıyla İfade Hürriyeti,” Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu, Ankara (2003); T. Ayhan Beydoğan, 
“Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi Işığında Türk Hukukunda Siyasî İfade Hürriyeti,” Liberal Düşünce 
Topluluğu, Ankara (2003). 
171 Tezcan et. al, Avrupa İnsan Hakları…; Bakır Çağlar, “İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesi Hukukunda 
Türkiye,” Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi, Akademi Forumu No: 6 (2002); Zühtü Arslan, “Avrupa İnsan 
Hakları Sözleşmesi ve Türk Anayasa Yargısı: Uyum Sorunu ve Öneriler,” Anayasa Yargısı, No: 17 
(2000). 
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legal literature.172 Some studies are limited to the listing and brief summary of 
judgments;173 others offer analyses of decisions and their execution.174 Generally, the 
overall purpose of the literature on the ECtHR’s case law on Turkey is to provide a 
practitioner’s guide for lawyers, judges and prosecutors who do not speak English 
and/or do not follow the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. At the same time, there are also 
studies assessing to what extent recent reforms achieve the alignment of national law 
with European standards and point out the outstanding issues that need to be tackled 
by lawmakers.175 The overall consensus in the literature is that notwithstanding the 
significant legal reforms undertaken in recent years, the domestic legal order falls far 
short of European standards.  
Some ECtHR judgments have been widely commented on in the international 
literature. The controversial judgments in Refah Partisi176 and Leyla Şahin177 where 
the ECtHR deferred to the Constitutional Court’s subjugation of rights and liberties to 
Turkey’s idiosyncratic principle of secularism have faced fierce criticism by European 
scholars. One common point of criticism is that the ECtHR deviated from and indeed 
conflicted with its earlier jurisprudence on party dissolutions in Turkey. In contrast, 
domestic scholars have been conspicuously silent on the issue. The few studies that 
mention or analyze the Refah judgment display an implicit deference to Strasbourg 
without discussing the compatibility of these two judgments with European standards 
on human rights.178   
There is very limited academic literature on the impact of the ECtHR case law 
on national law and practice. The court’s recent judgment in İçyer is a notable 
exception. The decision has been criticized by both academic and policy studies for 
being premature, unjust and political. The ECtHR has been held responsible for the 
deterioration of the implementation of the law on compensation. Seemingly motivated 
by the desire to ease its workload,179 the court has been charged with giving a 
                                                 
172 Naz Çavuşoğlu, “İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi: Kararların Uygulanması; Türkiye Kararları: 
1995-Haziran 2003, Tazminat Tutarları,” Su Yayınları, İstanbul (2003); Hasan Karakuş, “Avrupa İnsan 
Hakları Mahkemesi Kararları ve Karşıoylarında Türkiye,” İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, İstanbul (2001); 
Osman Doğru and Atilla Nalbant, İnsan Hakları Avrupa Mahkemesi ve Türkiye Karar Özetleri: 1995-
2000 (İstanbul Barosu Yayınları, 2001). 
173 See e.g. Doğru and Nalbant, İnsan Hakları…; Doğru (ed.) İnsan Hakları … (2000); Doğru (ed.) 
İnsan Hakları … (1999). 
174 See e.g. Çağlar, İnsan Hakları…; Arslan, Avrupa İnsan Hakları…; Çavuşoğlu, İnsan Hakları… 
175 Fazıl  Sağlam, “Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nda Uluslararası Standartlara Uygunluk Sağlamak için 
Yapılması Gereken Değişiklikler,” Anayasa Yargısı, No: 17 (2000); Şeref Ünal, “Avrupa İnsan Hakları 
Mahkemesi Kararlarının Türk İç Hukukuna Etkileri,” Anayasa Yargısı, No: 17 (2000); Sağlam, 
“Avrupa İnsan Hakları…”; 
176 Chris Rumford, Failing the EU Test? Turkey’s National Programme, EU Candidature and the 
Complexities of Democratic Reform, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, (Spring 2002), 51; Kevin 
Boyle, Human Rights, Religion and Democracy: The Refah Party Case, Essex Human Rights Review 
Vol. 1 No. 1 (July 2004); Chris Rumford, “Failing the EU Test? Turkey’s National Programme, EU 
Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
(Spring 2002), 51; Christian Moe, “Strasbourg’s Construction of Islam: A Critique of the Refah 
Judgment,” paper presented at the Conference of Experts “The Turkish Welfare Party Case: 
Implications for Human Rights in Europe,” Central European University, Budapest, 2-3 June 2002.  
177 Case analysis, D. Christopher Decker and Marnie Lloydd, “Leyla Şahin v. Turkey,” European 
Human Rights Law Review, No. 6 (2004), 672-678. 
178 See e.g. Yusuf Şevki Hakyemez and Birol Akgün, “Limitations on the Freedom of Political Parties 
in Turkey and the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights,” Mediterranean Politics, 
Vol.7, No. 2, (2002). 
179 The court actually does refer to the 1,500 pending IDP claims and its heavy case load. 
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premature judgment solely on the basis of selected sample decisions presented by the 
government and leaving the IDPs at the mercy of the authorities.180  
Missing in the academic literature on the ECtHR-Turkey relationship is an 
analysis of the identities, strategies, purposes and coalitions of applicants.181 There is 
no study on recourse to Strasbourg by minority groups nor on the impact of the 
ECtHR case law on Turkey’s minority policies. As a result of the absence of research 
on the actors of litigation, the recent trend towards ethnic and religious diversification 
in the identity of individuals petitioning Strasbourg falls outside of research interest.  
The EU’s minority protection conditionality for accession has obliged Turkey 
to reluctantly undertake a series of legal reforms with the purpose of fulfilling the 
Copenhagen political criteria. This has led to the re-entry to the public debate of the 
long forgotten concept of minority rights. As a result, an ample amount of academic 
literature has emerged looking into specific periods in near history when minorities -- 
particularly non-Muslims -- have been persecuted, discriminated and expelled.182 
Others analyzed the impact of the EU accession on Turkey’s minority regime,183 and 
more specifically the substance and implementation of laws governing minorities.184 
The increasing interest in the relationship between the EU’s accession conditionality 
and minority rights was also shared by various national and international human rights 
organizations which released reports evaluating the progress achieved by Turkey and 
underlining the outstanding issues.185 The number of academic studies186 and policy 
                                                 
180 Toplum ve Hukuk Araştırmalar Vakfı (TOHAV), The Problem of Turkey’s Displaced Persons: An 
Action Plan for Their Return and Compensation (2006); Human Rights Watch, Unjust, Restrictive and 
Inconsistent: The Impact of Turkey’s Compensation Law with Respect to Internally Displaced People 
(2006); Dilek Kurban, Deniz Yükseker, Ayşe Betül Çelik, Turgay Ünalan and A. Tamer Aker, 
‘Zorunlu Göç’ ile Yüzleşmek: Türkiye’de Yerinden Edilme Sonrası Vatandaşlığın İnşası (TESEV, 
2006); Ahmet Tamer Aker, Ayşe Betül Çelik, Dilek Kurban, Turgay Ünalan and Hatice Deniz 
Yükseker, The Problem of Internal Displacement in Turkey: Assessment and Policy Proposals, 
(TESEV, 2005). 
181 The literature on the impact of the EU accession conditionality on the protection of human rights in 
Turkey similarly lacks studies on the role played in this process by the policy and litigation efforts of 
minority organizations. Instead, pro-EU forces among the civil society is considered to be a single actor 
that has been positively influential in the domestic reform process. See e.g. Paul Kubicek, “The 
European Union and Democratization ‘From Below’ in Turkey,” paper presented for the European 
Union Studies Association, Austin TX, 31 March-2 April 2005. 
182 On the 1923 population exchange of Muslims and Rums between Greece and Turkey, see Mehmet 
Ali Gökaçtı, Nüfus Mübadelesi: Kayıp Bir Kuşağın Hikayesi (İletişim, 2005); on the expulsion of Jews 
from Eastern Thrace, see Rıfat Bali, Devletin Yahudileri ve ‘Öteki’ Yahudi (İletişim, 2004), Ayhan 
Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Türkleştirme’ Politikaları (İletişim, 2000); on the mob campaign against 
Rums, Armenians and Jews in Istanbul 6-7 September 1955, see Dilek Güven, Cumhuriyet Dönemi 
Azınlık Stratejileri ve Politikaları Bağlamında 6-7 Eylül Olayları (İletişim, 2006), Ali Tuna Kuyucu, 
“Ethno-religious ‘Unmixing’ of ‘Turkey’: 6-7 September as a Case in Turkish Nationalism”, Nations 
and Nationalism (2005), 361-380; on the levy of a discriminatory wealth tax on non-Muslims in 1942, 
see Rıfat Bali, Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni: 1923-1945 (İletişim, 2005), Aktar, Varlık Vergisi… ; on the 
deportation of Rums in 1964, see Hülya Demir and Rıdvan Aktar, İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri (İletişim, 
2004); on the confiscation of properties belonging to non-Muslims, see Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de 
Azınlıklar: Kavramlar- Teori- Lozan- İç Mevzuat- Uygulama (İletişim, 2005), Kurban, 
“Unravelling…”; on the nationalization of the economy through the transfer of wealth from non-
Muslims to Muslims, see  Ayhan Aktar, Türk Milliyetçiliği, Gayrimüslimler ve Ekonomik Dönüşüm 
(İletişim, 2006). 
183 Ahmet İçduygu and B. Ali Soner, “Turkish Minority Rights Regime: Between Difference and 
Equality,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May 2006), 447-468. 
184 Kurban, “Unravelling…”; Kurban, “Confronting…”; Oran, Türkiye’de… 
185 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Turkey: A Minority Policy of Systematic 
Negation (October 2006); Nurcan Kaya and Clive Baldwin, Minorities in Turkey: Submission to the 
European Union and the Government of Turkey, Minority Rights Group International (2004);    
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reports187 on the impact of the EU process on the protection of civil and political 
rights has also increased. Inter-governmental organizations such as the European 
Commission,188 the European Parliament, and the OSCE189 released reports and 
resolutions on Turkey’s performance in fulfilling the EU’s human and minority rights 
conditionality.  
One common theme in the literature is the nearly systematic bureaucratic 
resistance to the implementation of laws enacted by the legislative and the executive 
branches. The tension between the elected and appointed officials is perceived as an 
indicator of the democratic deficit in the political regime in Turkey. The general 
conclusion in these studies is that while Turkey has come a long way in comparative 
terms towards consolidating democracy and protecting human rights, there is still a 
long way to go both in terms of legislation and implementation. 
 
B. The Implementation of the EU Accession Criteria and the ECtHR Judgments  
 
Since Turkey’s declaration as an official candidate for the EU accession, a series of 
constitutional and legislative reforms have been adopted to comply with the EU 
conditionality. Notwithstanding the removal of some of the restrictions on rights and 
freedoms, the laws fall short of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. Significant 
problems remain in laws governing political parties, associations and freedom of 
expression. Arguably, the remaining draconian provisions in domestic law should not 
necessarily impede the free exercise of rights and freedoms in light of the direct effect 
of the ECHR under the new Article 90 of the constitution. However, the Turkish 
courts continue to resist implementing the case law of the ECtHR in their judgments.  
In the area of freedom of expression, the constitutional amendments removed 
from Articles 26 and 28 the restriction on the use of any “language prohibited by law” 
in the expression of thought and in broadcasting, respectively. However, they left 
untouched the restrictions attached to the exercise of these rights for the purposes of, 
inter alia, safeguarding “the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation.” Legislative reforms bolstered the constitutional amendments. Yet, in some 
cases the legislature effectively re-enacted the draconian provisions of the code under 
new names. For example, Articles 301 and 216 effectively replaced Articles 159 and 
312, respectively. Prosecutors have a strong tendency to use the new restrictive 
provisions in bringing charges against individuals advocating the rights of minorities.  
While considerable progress had been made in lifting some of the restrictions 
in the anti-terror law, the June 2006 amendments constitute a serious setback.190 The 
new law retains the over-inclusive and purpose-based definition of terrorism of the 
                                                                                                                                            
186 Piotr Zalewski, Sticks, Carrots and Great Expectations: Human Rights Conditionality and Turkey’s 
Path Towards Membership of the European Union, Center for International Relations, Reports and 
Analyses (December 2004); Şaban Kardaş, “Human Rights and Democracy Promotion: The Case of 
Turkey-EU Relations,” Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 2002);  
187 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, World Report/Turkey 2006; Amnesty International, 2006 
Report/Turkey.  
188 See generally European Commission Regular Reports on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession. 
189 For a review of the implications of the new Penal Code on freedom of press in Turkey, see OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, Miklos Haraszti, Review of the Draft Turkish Penal Code: 
Freedom of Media Concerns, May 2005, http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2005/03/14223_en.pdf. 
190 Terörle Mücadele Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun [Law on the Amendment of the 
Law on the Fight Against Terrorism], No. 5532, 29 June 2006, Official Gazette No. 26232, 18 July 
2006. 
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1991 law, and introduces a wide and long list of “terrorist offences”191 and “offences 
committed for terrorist purposes.”192 It introduces new restrictions on free speech,193 
creates new expression offences such as carrying the emblem or signs of a “terrorist 
organisation” or chanting slogans deemed to support such organization,194 
criminalizes “praise of terrorist offences and offenders or making the propaganda of 
the terrorist organization”195 and imposes severe sanctions on the media such as heavy 
fines for owners and editors of media organs196 and prison sentences for journalists.197 
Most disconcertingly, the law reintroduces the temporary closures of publications 
without a formal hearing and even at times upon the order of a prosecutor.198  
The ECtHR’s Doğan judgment prompted the Turkish Government to intensify 
its efforts to enact a compensation law for IDPs, which was eventually passed on 17 
July 2004.199 The stated purposes of the law included the fulfilment of commitments 
made to the EU and non-payment of high compensation in Strasbourg. These efforts 
paid off: In January 2006, only three months after the law came into effect,200 the 
ECtHR ruled in İçyer201 that the law provides an effective domestic remedy.202  
The amendments to the Law on Associations lifted many of the restrictions on 
freedom of association.203 The establishment of associations is no longer subject to 
prior authorization.204 The reforms also created more space for the establishment of 
associations by minorities or for advocating minority rights. Associations are allowed 
to use minority languages in non-official correspondence.205 However, the ban on the 
establishment of associations for purposes prohibited in the constitution remains.206 
More specifically, the regulation207 bans the establishment of associations that engage 
in “prohibited activities”208 and are “in contravention of law and morality.”209 Neither 
the law nor the regulation defines the “prohibited purposes” or “prohibited activities.” 
However, one might suspect that they aim to protect the constitutional principles of 
territorial unity and national security. The over-inclusive reading of these principles 
by Turkish prosecutors and judges in the past have resulted in the inclusion among 
prohibited purposes, inter alia, of the advocacy of peaceful solutions to the Kurdish 
problem,210 including the granting of minority status to the Kurds.211  
                                                 
191 Id. art. 2.   
192 Id. art. 3. 
193 Id. art. 5.  
194 Id. art. 6.  
195 Id. art. 5.  
196 Id. art. 5.  
197 Id. art. 6. 
198 Id. art. 5.  
199 Supra note 110.  
200 Terör ve Terörle Mücadeleden Doğan Zararların Karşılanması Hakkında Yönetmelik [Implementing 
Regulation on Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism], 
Decision no. 2004/7955, 4 October 2004, Official Gazette No. 25619, 20 October 2004. 
201 ECtHR, Aydın İçyer v. Turkey, 12 January 2006. 
202 Thus, the Akdıvar exception was effectively nullified.  
203 Dernekler Kanunu [Law on Associations], No. 5253, 4 November 2004, Official Gazette No. 25649, 
23 November 2004. 
204 Id., Article 3(1). 
205 Id., Article 31 (requiring associations to use Turkish in their correspondence with official bodies. 
206 Id., Article 30(b). 
207 Dernekler Yönetmeliği [Regulation on Associations], implementing Law No. 5253, Official 
Gazette No. 25772, 31 March 2005. 
208 Id., Article 30. 
209 Id., Article 56. 
210  For example, the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the Socialist Party on the ground, inter alia, 
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The domestic framework governing political parties is one area that needs 
further reforms to achieve harmonization with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. On the one 
hand, the constitutional amendments achieved significant progress by substantially 
increasing the threshold for the dissolution of a political party. Pursuant to Article 69, 
the “permanent dissolution of a political party shall be decided when it is established 
that the statute and programme of the political party violate the provisions of the 
fourth paragraph of Article 68.”212 The Constitutional Court may not make such a 
judgment unless it concludes that the party has become “the centre of activities”213 
contrary to the principles laid out in Article 68. Article 69(6) introduced a two-part 
test in determining this threshold: The actions must be “carried out intensively by the 
members of that party” and be shared implicitly or explicitly by the grand congress, 
general chairmanship or the central decision-making or administrative organs of that 
party or by the group’s general meeting or group executive board in the parliament.  
Notwithstanding this significant general measure, in defiance of the principle 
of the hierarchy of laws, the Law on Political Parties (LPP) continues to contain 
several restrictions which contradict the letter and spirit of the relevant constitutional 
provisions as well as the standards established by the ECtHR. Article 96(3) prohibits 
the use of the word “communist” in the name of a political party, notwithstanding the 
ECtHR’s unequivocal ruling in United Communist Party. Another problematic 
provision of the LPP is Article 81, which bans political parties from “arguing” that 
minorities exist in Turkey, promoting minority languages and cultures, and using 
minority languages in their written materials, activities and statements. 
Aspiring for EU membership, Turkey found itself having to fulfil the minority 
protection conditionality, notwithstanding the challenge the latter posed to its official 
policies. Turkey’s minority policy dates back to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, when 
the newly founded republic was practically compelled by Western powers to grant 
minority status to its non-Muslim population.214 Since then, minority rights have been 
associated with foreign interference in internal affairs, and portrayed in the official 
discourse as a once and for all granting of special treatment limited to non-Muslim 
citizens.215 The de jure protection granted to all non-Muslims under Lausanne was de 
facto restricted to Armenians, Rums and Jews, unlawfully excluding others such as 
the Assyrians. It was against this historical background that Turkey found itself 
having to fulfill the EU’s minority protection conditionality.  
                                                                                                                                            
that its activities aimed at a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem encouraged separatism and 
threatened national unity and territorial integrity. 
211 In another case, the Constitutional Court dissolved a political party which advocated in its program 
the acknowledgment in the Turkish Constitution of “the existence of the Kurds,” on the basis that the 
party was “likely to undermine the territorial integrity of the State and the unity of the nation.”   
212 Article 68(4): “The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be 
in conflict with the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, 
human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the 
democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or 
dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.” 
213 Article 69(6). 
214 For a discussion of Turkey’s minority policies and their historical evolution,  see Oran, Türkiye’de 
Azınlıklar…; Kurban, Unravelling… 
215 That Turkey perceives the question of minority rights as settled by the Treaty of Lausanne is evident 
in, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describing the official minority policy: “The status of 
minorities has been internationally certified by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, according to which there 
are only non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. It is wrong, according to this definition, to refer to our 
citizens of Kurdish descent as a ‘Kurdish minority’.” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Frequently Asked Questions, at http: //www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/acl/faq.htm. 
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Towards that end, Turkey undertook a number of constitutional and legislative 
reforms in the last few years. The new laws granted ethnic minorities a limited and 
conditional right to broadcasting in national public and private television and radio 
stations, the right to teach and learn their languages in private courses and removed 
some of the restrictions on the property rights of non-Muslims.216 The reforms were 
limited to granting limited and conditional language and property rights. Various 
ethnic minorities’ demands for public education in mother tongue have not been met; 
broadcasting is limited to five selected minority languages, subject to time and 
content restrictions and prohibitive red tape requirements; and no legal framework has 
been adopted to allow the return of confiscated properties or the payment of just 
compensation to non-Muslim community foundations. Though the progress achieved 
is significant, particularly in relative terms, the legislature carefully avoided any 
explicit reference in the letter and spirit of the reform laws that could suggest the 
reformulation of the official policy on minorities. It also made minorities’ exercise of 
their limited rights prohibitively difficult by attaching restrictive conditions to them 
and by conferring on bureaucrats a virtually unchecked authority in implementing the 
laws through executive regulations.  
The EU’s accession conditionality has confronted Turkey with the challenge 
to re-construct its discriminatory citizenship definition and practices. Not only various 
minorities, but also a significant segment of the majority feels excluded by the ethnic 
and religious based citizenship in Turkey. Enacting legal reforms has proved to be a 
necessary but insufficient condition of bringing real and meaningful change in social 
and official attitudes towards minorities. The internalization of reform laws requires a 
radical transformation of the prevalent mentality of both the state and the society.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
An analysis of the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of human and 
minority rights in Turkey would be incomplete without the simultaneous study of the 
EU accession process as an equally significant external factor. This is most evident in 
the fact that, notwithstanding the high number of judgments the ECtHR has issued 
against Turkey over the years, their execution has started only after the initiation of 
the EU reform process and accelerated after the JDP came to power in 2002. Since the 
declaration of Turkey as an official candidate for accession in 1999, the EU has 
played a central role in monitoring the Turkish Government’s execution of the ECtHR 
case law, documenting the progress achieved in that regard and the outstanding issues, 
and providing training to key judicial and administrative authorities in tandem with 
the Council of Europe.  
The ways in which the Strasbourg jurisprudence has made a difference in the 
Turkish case seems to depend on various factors, such as the type of violation in 
question, the commitment of the government to executing the judgment concerned, 
the political nature of the issue, the number of judgments and the amount of 
compensation Turkey was required to pay. While the government has come a long 
way in executing the ECtHR’s judgments on Article 3, for example, the same cannot 
be argued for the execution of case law concerning Article 10. The relative success in 
the execution of Article 3 judgments can be explained by a combination of various 
factors: the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture under customary 
                                                 
216 For an analysis of the substance and implementation of the reform laws relating to minority rights, 
see Kaya and Baldwin, Minorities in Turkey…; Kurban, Unravelling… 
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international law, the absolute prohibition of torture under the ECHR and the non-
derogable nature of the duty not to torture, the political will demonstrated by the JDP 
government in its campaign on “zero tolerance to torture,” and the relative ease in 
creating strong public support against torture and ill treatment. In contrast, freedom of 
expression is not a jus cogens principle, its protection under the ECHR is not absolute 
but is subject to certain restrictions, the JDP government’s commitment to freedom of 
expression is highly questionable in view especially of the draconian provisions 
introduced to the Penal Code and the anti-terror law, the highly political nature of 
Article 10 cases, most of which are linked to the Kurdish question, and the lack of 
public support for the absolute protection of freedom speech, particularly when such 
speech concerns the expression of alternative views on the Kurdish question and 
laicism.  
To gain a complete and comprehensive picture of the effect of the ECtHR case 
law on the protection of fundamental rights and liberties in Turkey, a comparative 
analysis of the execution of judgments concerning different rights violations (torture, 
protection of property, freedom of religion, freedom of expression) is suggested. Such 
analysis should take into account the political issues concerned as well as the specific 
social and political context in which the execution of the judgments is being 
deliberated. This report has sought to cover much of the secondary literature on the 
impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the domestic legal order as well as that of the 
EU accession process on the protection of human and minority rights in Turkey. This 
analysis could be developed further through a study of the primary sources as well as 
interviewing the primary actors. Some suggestions towards that end are: 
 
• Resolutions issued by the Committee of Ministers 
• Memoranda issued by the Committee of Ministers’ deputies 
• The European Commission’s annual progress reports on Turkey’s accession 
• Minutes of the debates in the Turkish parliament pertaining to legislation 
governing human and minority rights that are drafted with the purpose of 
executing the ECtHR case law and fulfilling the EU accession conditionality. 
Particular attention should be paid to the deliberations during the soon-to-be- 
reenacted law on foundations. 
• All recently enacted new laws towards complying with the EU conditionality and 
executing the ECtHR’s judgments. Particular attention should be given to the 
legislative reasoning of the reform laws. 
• The grounds stated in presidential vetoes, particularly with respect to the Law on 
Foundations. 
• Press coverage- particularly news in minority media. 
• Decisions of national courts in implementing the EU reform laws or executing the 
ECtHR judgments. 
• Interviews with domestic actors involved in litigating in Strasbourg and 
implementing the ECtHR’s case law. Among such actors are: 1) lawyers, 
particularly lawyers representing minorities (who, almost in all cases, belong to 
the same identity as their clients); 2) civil society organizations advocating human 
and minority rights; 3) representatives of non-Muslim communities (the Rum and 
Armenian Patriarchates, the office of the Rabbi); 4) minority organizations; 5) 
judges and prosecutors; 6) government officials from the following institutions: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Interior, Ministry on 
EU Affairs; Directorate General of Foundations; Directorate of Religious Affairs. 
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• Interviews with international actors: 1) members of the Turkish Delegation to the 
Council of Europe; 2) members of the Turkish Delegation to the EU; 3) lawyers 
working at the Turkey desk of the European Court of Human Rights; 4) lawyers 
working at the Committee of Ministers; 5) EU officials working at the 
enlargement office of the European Commission; 6) officials working at the 
European Commission delegation to Turkey. 
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ANNEX I: SHORT VERSION OF THE STATE OF THE ART REPORT 
INTENDED FOR POLICY USERS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Turkey joined the Council of Europe in 1949. It ratified the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) on 19 March 
1954. After 1987, when the government granted its citizens the right to petition the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), applied for membership to the European 
Union (EU), and declared a state of emergency in eastern and southeastern parts of 
the country, there has been a drastic increase in the number of applications. Turkey 
found itself having to undertake drastic legal and political measures to align its legal 
framework with the ECHR. Since 1999, the year when the EU declared Turkey as an 
official candidate for membership, the process of executing the ECtHR judgments 
overlapped with that of fulfilling the political criteria for accession to the EU. 
This short version of the state of the art report aims to understand the impact 
that the ECtHR jurisprudence has had on domestic law in Turkey, particularly with 
regards to the protection of minority rights. Doing so, it considers as another critical 
independent variable the EU which has played a significant role in pressuring Turkey 
to align its legal order with Council of Europe human rights standards.  The rest of 
this paper is organized as follows: Part II provides a brief analysis of the national 
legal framework on human rights and an overview of judicial and non-judicial 
monitoring mechanisms. Particular attention is given to human rights reforms enacted 
during the EU accession process. Part III offers an analysis of the cases and 
controversies before the ECtHR as well as the identity and litigation strategy of 
petitioners. The domestic execution of ECtHR judgments is also discussed here. Part 
IV provides an introduction to literature pertaining to the implementation of the 
ECtHR judgments in Turkey. Part V offers preliminary conclusions on ECtHR’s 
impact on human rights protection in Turkey. 
 
II. The Protection of Human Rights in Turkey 
 
The Turkish Constitution contains provisions extending a general protection for 
human rights. In addition, Turkey is a party to the major international human rights 
conventions and some of the human rights instruments under the auspices of the 
Council of Europe, including the ECHR. Article 90(5), a recent addition to the 
constitution, stipulates that in case of a conflict, international treaties that Turkey is a 
party to have supremacy over national law. Pursuant to this amendment which gives 
self-executing power and direct effect to the ECHR, Turkish courts are required to 
enforce the supremacy of the Convention over domestic laws. However, this 
supremacy does not extend to the constitution. The Constitutional Court is not 
formally bound by the ECHR, but attributes a persuasive authority to the judgments of 
the ECtHR. 
As a member to the Council of Europe, Turkey is obliged to abide by the 
terms of the ECtHR and effectively protect and enforce the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the convention. Since 1987, Turkish citizens have the right to petition 
the ECtHR. While the prerequisite for applying to Strasbourg is the exhaustion of 
domestic legal remedies, the ECtHR has exempted certain applications from that 
requirement in the past.   
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The judiciary is the principal institution enforcing the protection of human 
rights. Article 40 of the Constitution grants everyone whose rights have been violated 
the right to apply to the “competent authorities,” where the subject of unlawful 
treatment is public officials, and requires administrative courts, courts of justice and 
the Constitutional Court to review human rights cases falling under their jurisdiction 
and mandate. Due to the duality of the Turkish legal order, military courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over cases against military authorities or relating to military 
service. The constitution does not grant individuals the right to petition the 
Constitutional Court to contest human rights violations committed by public agents 
and institutions. 
 
III. Litigating Strasbourg: Case Law, Actors, Implementation, Impact  
 
Turkey is among the state parties most complained against in Strasbourg. With 20,141 
applications lodged between 1 November 1998 and 2006, Turkey ranked sixth among 
the 46 member states following Russia, Poland, Romania, Italy and France. In 2006 
alone, 2,280 new applications were lodged against Turkey. Of the 1,560 judgments 
that the ECtHR handed down in 2006, the highest number (334) concerned Turkey. 
As of August 2006, in 196 of these judgments, the Court found Turkey in violation of 
the ECHR. As of 1 January 2007, 10% (9,000) of the total number of cases (89,900) 
pending before the ECtHR are those filed against Turkey.  
Initially, the ratification of the ECHR did not capture much attention. It was 
only in 1987 when the Turkish Government accepted the right of individual petition 
that the ECHR generated a high interest among the public and the media. 1987 carries 
a further significance for the European integration project since that was the year 
when Turkey put forth a formal application for membership to the EU. Lastly, the 
declaration of the state of emergency in the Kurdish populated eastern and 
southeastern regions of Turkey is another factor which made 1987 a turning point in 
the ECtHR’s case law.  
An analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence on Turkey shows that the legal 
grounds of applications clustered around Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition 
of ill treatment, degrading and inhuman punishment and treatment), Article 5 (right to 
liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect for private and family 
life), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of association), 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 (right to property). Very few cases 
were brought to Strasbourg on the basis of a violation of Article 9 (freedom of 
religion). Notwithstanding the high number of cases where applicants alleged breach 
of Article 14, the ECtHR found violation in only one case concerning gender 
discrimination.   
 
A. ECtHR Case Law  
 
The Kurdish question featured predominantly in the ECtHR’s case law on Turkey. 
Majority of the applications relates to acts such as torture, ill treatment, summary 
executions, disappearances, village evictions and property destruction committed by 
the security forces in the state of emergency region. Others concern the dissolution of 
political parties and the prosecution of individuals advocating a democratic solution to 
the Kurdish question. Petitions filed by Kurds were found admissible, with a few 
exceptions, and led to judgments where the ECtHR found Turkey to have violated 
Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 and Article 1 of Protocol 1. In addition, cases were also 
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brought by individuals who were prosecuted for expressing views differing from the 
official policies on headscarf, Islam and laicism as well as parties that were dissolved 
on the ground that their activities challenged the secular order.  
 
1. Freedom of Expression  
 
The largest number of petitions and judgments that fall within the scope of 
JURISTRAS concerns the restriction of freedom of expression and the criminalization 
of political dissent. Out of 63 petitions filed with the court, 58 resulted in the finding 
of a violation and four in friendly settlements. In only one case, the seminal case of 
Zana, did the court not find a violation of Article 10. The vast majority of cases 
concern the prosecution of journalists, human rights advocates and intellectuals for 
expressing dissenting views on the Kurdish question, while a few concerned the 
prosecution of individuals with Islamic backgrounds who expressed critical views on 
state policies on religion. In addition, there are a marginal number of cases concerning 
the prosecution of the advocacy of conscientious objection and the protest of the IMF. 
The charges in these cases were brought under former Article 312 of the Penal Code 
and former Article 8 of the anti-terror law, which criminalized separatist propaganda 
against the unity and integrity of the state as well as incitement to hatred and hostility 
on the basis of race, social class or region. The applicants relied on Articles 3, 6, 9, 
10, 11, 14 and Article 1 of Protocol 1, whereas the ECtHR found breaches of Articles 
6(1) and 10. 
 
2. Cases Brought by Minorities under Articles 3, 5 and 6  
 
The second highest number of petitions against Turkey concerns petitions filed under 
Articles 3, 5 and 6. The cases analyzed in this section of the report have been selected 
on the basis of the applications lodged by minorities under these articles. Out of 60 
petitions, 43 resulted in a judgment against Turkey and 13 in friendly settlements. 
While the court found no violation in three cases, one petition was declared 
inadmissible. The vast majority of the petitions were filed by Kurds on grounds of 
human rights abuses (such as incommunicado detention, torture, ill treatment, 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty) committed by security officers in the state of 
emergency region. In many cases, the applicants were also convicted by state security 
courts, whose benches at the time included a military judge along with two civilian 
judges. In these cases, petitioners raised Articles 3, 5, 6 and 14, whereas the ECtHR 
found breaches of Articles 3, 5 and 6.  
 
3. Property Rights  
 
The third largest group of cases concerns property rights claims, the vast majority of 
which were filed by Kurds who had been evicted from their villages by security forces 
or were obliged to leave their homes at the height of the armed conflict between the 
PKK and the army. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the nearly 3,000 
applications filed as of August 2003, 1,500 related to allegations of forced eviction 
and property destruction. Instrumental in the high number of petitions has been the 
exception made by the ECtHR in Akdıvar and Others to the principle of the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies in applications originating from the region. Out of 
31 petitions raising property rights abuses, 27 were filed by Kurdish internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) whereas the rest were expropriation cases and environmental 
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disputes. The court issued 18 judgments against Turkey and one in favor, while it 
found two applications inadmissible. In 10 cases, all filed by Kurdish IDPs, friendly 
settlements were reached between the parties. Petitioners raised Articles 3, 8, 13, 14 
and Article 1 of Protocol 1. The ECtHR found breaches of Articles 3, 8 and Article 1 
of Protocol 1. For the first time in Doğan and Others, the ECtHR identified a 
structural problem of internal displacement in Turkey and called on the government to 
design policies towards its solution. Two years later, in 2006, the court held in its 
İçyer judgment that the Compensation Law, which had entered into force on October 
2004, was an effective remedy for IDPs. It thereby ruled the İçyer and all other 1500 
pending applications inadmissible. In Fener Rum Lisesi Vakfı, the first judgment ever 
in a case brought by a non-Muslim minority in Turkey, the ECtHR ruled for the first 
time on Turkey’s policies towards the property rights of non-Muslim foundations and 
held that the confiscation of the properties belonging to these foundations violated 
Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1. 
 
4. Freedom of Association 
 
The fourth largest group of cases against Turkey concerns those regarding the 
dissolution and prosecution of associations and political parties. Out of 11 cases, the 
court found a violation of Article 11 in nine cases. The most important group of cases 
is the decisions concerning political party dissolutions, four of which resulted in a 
finding of violation whereas in Refah Partisi the ECtHR ruled in favour of the 
government. While the earlier cases concerned the dissolution of pro-Kurdish parties 
in the name of national unity and territorial integrity, Refah Partisi concerned the 
closure of a pro-Islamist party in the name of laicism. In United Communist Party of 
Turkey, the ECtHR held that the dissolution of a party solely on the basis of its 
program, before it had any chance to engage in activities, infringes on Article 11. The 
ECtHR ruled in the case of Socialist Party that a party’s advocacy of goals, such as 
the establishment of a federal regime, which are considered to be incompatible with 
constitutional principles does not make it incompatible with democracy. In Refah 
Partisi, where the ECtHR found the party to constitute a serious threat to the secular 
regime in Turkey, the court gave a very rare judgment in its overall jurisprudence, 
upholding the dissolution of a political party. 
 
5. Respect for Home, Private and Family Life 
 
There are six ECtHR decisions concerning privacy rights, where petitioners relied 
solely on Article 8, concerning forced gynecological examination, the inability of 
married women to use their maiden names, operation of gold mines on residential 
areas, incommunicado detention without notification of families, unlawful search and 
seizure, and paternity dispute. The earliest judgment is dated July 2003. Ünal Tekeli is 
the only judgment in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Turkey where the court found a 
violation of Article 14. The case was lodged by a female lawyer who challenged a 
domestic law requiring married women to use both their maiden name and their 
husband’s last name on official documents. The ECtHR found the differential 
treatment of married men and married women to constitute gender discrimination.  
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6. Freedom of Religion 
 
To this date, the ECtHR issued judgment in only two cases where applicants relied 
primarily on Article 9. Kalaç concerned the compulsory retirement of a military judge 
pursuant to the order of the Supreme Military Council on the ground that his religious 
activities showed lack of loyalty to the principle of secularism. In Leyla Şahin, the 
issue was the compatibility of an administrative ban on the wearing of headscarf at 
universities, which caused the applicant who refused to take off her headscarf to be 
expelled from medical school. In both cases, the ECtHR did not find a violation. In 
Leyla Şahin, the ECtHR held that the ban was justified by the legitimate interest to 
protect secularism. Minorities have until recently been reluctant to take their freedom 
of religion claims to Strasbourg. However, this has started to change very recently 
with various religious minorities filing cases with the ECtHR. Currently, applications 
lodged by Alevi and Protestant minorities are pending before the court. On the other 
hand, the disillusionment caused by the ECtHR’s ruling in the case of Leyla Şahin 
may discourage members of the Sunni Muslim majority from petitioning Strasbourg 
in the future. 
 
B. National and International Actors Advocating Minority Rights 
 
Kurdish lawyers and activists played an instrumental role in the construction of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence on Turkey. Lawyers associated with the bar associations of 
Diyarbakır and Istanbul, the Istanbul-based Foundation on Social and Legal Studies 
(Toplumsal ve Hukuk Araştırmaları Vakfı-TOHAV), Human Rights Association and 
the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey became the pioneers of litigating in 
Strasbourg and developed an expertise in this regard. In this process, they closely 
cooperated with lawyers in Europe, particularly those affiliated with the Human 
Rights Centre at University of Essex and the Kurdish Human Rights Project, both in 
the United Kingdom. British lawyers associated with these organizations filed scores 
of petitions, alone or in cooperation with Kurdish lawyers. 
Turkey’s EU accession process has been instrumental in encouraging new 
minority groups to lodge petitions in Strasbourg. The nature of claims and the identity 
of applicants have started to diversify: minorities now seek relief against 
discrimination in education and for effective political participation, the protection of 
religious freedoms and the right to education. This is evident, for example, in the 
petitions filed by Armenians, Rum Orthodox Christians, Protestants and Alevis. The 
EU accession process has also brought to the fore a new international actor: the 
European Commission in Brussels and its delegation office in Ankara. The annual 
progress reports of the European Commission have become the principal assessment 
tool for the advancement of human rights protection in Turkey. At the national level, 
various human rights groups such as those named above have played a critical role in 
documenting human rights abuses committed during the state of emergency and 
raising awareness on the plight of the Kurds. Today, these groups work in close 
cooperation with the European Commission through providing the latter with 
information for its annual reports.  
 
C. Strategic Litigation 
 
In the Turkish case, the number of isolated petitions which vary based on the 
circumstances of the applicant is quite marginal. With the exception of a few number 
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of case concerning land expropriation, environmental issues, paternity dispute and 
gender equality where applicants sought individual remedy, the vast majority of 
petitions were brought by Kurds or parties advocating their rights. Although the 
Kurds have been engaged in strategic litigation since early 1990s, their claims 
clustered around rights to property, liberty, fair trial and the right to be free from 
torture rather than challenging Turkey’s minority policy. However, both the identity 
of applicants and the nature of claims have started to diversify in recent years. New 
minority groups have started to bring their claims to Strasbourg. What is contested in 
these applications is effectively Turkey’s exclusive citizenship concept and 
discriminatory policies against minorities. These cases point to an increasing resort by 
various minority groups to Strasbourg when prior domestic political and legal efforts 
to change the discriminatory aspects of the national legal framework have failed. As 
new minority groups seek change through litigation, however, the Kurds and the 
Muslims are losing faith in the reliability of the ECtHR as an external actor in their 
political struggle in Turkey. The İçyer, Refah and Şahin judgments have cost the 
ECtHR legitimacy in the eyes of the Kurds and the Muslims, who voice their 
frustration and disillusionment with what they increasingly perceive to be a political 
court.  
 
D. Domestic Execution of Judgments 
 
As a state party to the ECHR, Turkey is under an obligation to secure everyone within 
its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR and to abide by the final 
judgments of the Court. This confers on judicial, political and executive authorities 
the responsibility to execute the ECtHR’s judgments. Article 13 guarantees the 
availability of a national remedy to enforce the rights and freedoms granted under the 
ECHR. While Turkey, as all other states parties, has some discretion as to the manner 
in which it conforms to its Article 13 obligations, the remedy must be “effective” in 
practice as well as in law.  
In its judgments in the village eviction and property destruction cases, the 
ECtHR stressed that ‘effective remedy’ entails, in addition to the payment of 
compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of 
leading to the identification and punishment of perpetrators. It also expressed its 
preference for the restoration as far as possible the situation existing before the breach 
(restitutio in integrum). However, it added that if restitutio in integrum is in practice 
impossible, the states are free to choose the means to comply with a judgment. 
Thereby, in all cases concerning the eviction of Kurds from their villages, the ECtHR 
declined applicants’ requests for declaratory judgment.  
The Committee of Ministers has supervised Turkey’s execution of the 
ECtHR’s judgments, particularly focusing on those where security forces were found 
to have committed acts of torture, inhuman treatment, destruction of property, illegal 
killings and disappearances. Turkey took a series of general measures, which served 
to comply with its legal duties under Article 46 of the ECHR and to fulfill its political 
commitments to the EU. These measures concentrated on four main areas, as called 
upon by the Committee of Ministers: 1) education and training of members of the 
security forces; 2) reform of the criminal justice system; 3) compensating victims; and 
4) training of prosecutors and judges.  
The government’s efforts have been undermined by a resilient bureaucracy 
who curtailed the rights and freedoms granted under new laws. To overcome this 
resistance, the government, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers and 
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with a view to ensure that authorities comply with the ECtHR judgments, issued 
executive circulars addressed to judicial and administrative authorities and undertook 
human rights training for educators, police and gendarmerie, judges, prosecutors and 
lawyers. The Council of Europe and the EU have been actively involved in the human 
rights training programs.  
The Committee of Ministers has closely monitored the execution of judgments 
on fair trial, where the government took both individual and general measures. In 
Sadak, Zana, Dicle and Doğan, a law dated 2003 allowed the applicants’ retrial and 
release pending trial. In Öcalan, the applicant was paid just satisfaction and his 
request for a retrial was examined on the merits. However, the request was rejected by 
a court on the grounds that the nature of the crime and the evidence would lead to the 
same outcome. A series of general measures were also adopted to prevent similar 
violations in the future: the abolishment of death penalty; and the provision of 
detainees the right to see a judge within 24 hours of detention in regular cases and 
three days in exceptional cases, the right to a lawyer in cases with a minimum of 5 
years and the right to correspond with a lawyer in confidentiality and without time 
restrictions; the replacement of the military judge in state security courts by a civil 
judge; and the abolishment of state security courts.  
The following general measures were adopted in the area of freedom of 
expression: the introduction into the penal code of the criterion of “incitement in a 
manner which is explicitly dangerous to public order” for prosecution of speech; the 
lifting of penalties for the expression of thoughts that are merely critical; the repeal of 
Article 8 of the anti-terror law. 
While Turkey has made significant progress in executing the ECtHR case law, 
as of 2006, cases against Turkey still represented 14.4% of the judgments pending 
before the Committee of Ministers. Of these, 93 relate to effective remedies against 
abuses by security forces and 115 to freedom of expression.  
 
IV. Literature Review 
 
The European Commission’s emphasis in its reports on Turkey’s execution of the 
ECtHR judgments as well as the Turkish Parliament’s reference to both fulfilling the 
EU accession conditionality and executing the ECtHR case law in justifying the 
legislative purposes of some reform laws show that the EU accession process and the 
ECtHR case law play an interdependent role in facilitating the harmonization of 
national law with European norms. And yet, the literature on these two phenomena 
has so far developed independently of each other. There is no literature on the 
relevance of the EU accession process for the alignment of Turkey’s legal framework 
with the ECtHR jurisprudence. 
 
A. Literature Review on the EU Accession Process and the ECtHR Case Law  
 
There is ample domestic academic literature in Turkey on the protection of human 
rights under the ECHR and on the ECtHR jurisprudence. There are also studies 
focusing on the protection of selected rights and liberties, such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and religious freedom. More specifically, the 
relationship between the ECHR and the Turkish legal order and the ECtHR’s case law 
on Turkey has been the object of academic research. Some studies are limited to the 
listing and brief summary of judgments; others offer analyses of decisions and their 
execution. Generally, the purpose of the literature is to provide a practitioner’s guide 
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for lawyers, judges and prosecutors who do not speak English and/or do not follow 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. At the same time, there are also studies assessing to 
what extent recent reforms achieve the alignment of national law with European 
standards and point out the outstanding issues that need to be tackled by lawmakers. 
The overall consensus in the literature is that notwithstanding the significant legal 
reforms undertaken in recent years, the domestic legal order falls far short of 
European standards.  
Some ECtHR judgments have been widely commented on in the international 
literature. The controversial judgments in Refah Partisi and Leyla Şahin have faced 
fierce criticism by European scholars. One common point of criticism is that the 
ECtHR deviated from and indeed conflicted with its earlier jurisprudence on party 
dissolutions in Turkey. In contrast, domestic scholars have been conspicuously silent 
on the issue. The few studies that mention or analyze the Refah judgment display an 
implicit deference to Strasbourg without discussing the compatibility of these two 
judgments with European standards.  
There is very limited academic literature on the impact of the ECtHR case law 
on national law and practice. The court’s recent judgment in İçyer is a notable 
exception. The decision has been criticized by both academic and policy studies for 
being premature, unjust and political. The ECtHR has been held responsible for the 
deterioration in implementation. Seemingly motivated by the desire to ease its 
workload, the court has been charged with giving a premature judgment solely on the 
basis of selected sample decisions presented by the government and leaving the IDPs 
at the mercy of the authorities.  
Missing in the academic literature on the ECtHR-Turkey relationship is an 
analysis of the identities, strategies, purposes and coalitions of applicants. There is no 
study on recourse to Strasbourg by minority groups nor on the impact of the ECtHR 
case law on Turkey’s minority policies. As a result of the absence of research on the 
actors of litigation, the recent trend towards ethnic and religious diversification in the 
identity of individuals petitioning Strasbourg falls outside of research interest.  
The EU’s minority protection conditionality for accession has obliged Turkey 
to reluctantly undertake a series of legal reforms with the purpose of fulfilling the 
Copenhagen political criteria. Ample amount of academic literature has emerged 
looking into specific periods in near history when minorities -- particularly non-
Muslims -- have been persecuted, discriminated and expelled. Others analyzed the 
impact of the EU accession on Turkey’s minority regime, and more specifically the 
substance and implementation of laws governing minorities. Various national and 
international human rights organizations released reports evaluating the progress 
achieved by Turkey and underlining the outstanding issues. The number of academic 
studies and policy reports on the impact of the EU process on the protection of human 
rights has also increased. Inter-governmental organizations released reports and 
resolutions on Turkey’s performance in fulfilling the EU conditionality.  
One common theme in the literature is the nearly systematic bureaucratic 
resistance to the implementation of laws enacted by the legislative and the executive 
branches. The tension between the elected and appointed officials is perceived as an 
indicator of the democratic deficit in the political regime in Turkey. The general 
conclusion is that while Turkey has come a long way in comparative terms towards 
consolidating democracy and protecting human rights, there is still a long way to go 
both in terms of legislation and implementation. 
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B. The Implementation of the EU Accession Criteria and the ECtHR Judgments  
 
Since Turkey’s declaration as a candidate for the EU accession, a series of legal 
reforms have been adopted to comply with the EU conditionality. Notwithstanding the 
removal of some of the restrictions on rights and freedoms, the laws fall short of 
fulfilling the EU’s criteria for accession. Significant problems remain in laws 
governing political parties, associations and freedom of expression.  
In the area of freedom of expression, constitutional restrictions on the use of 
minority languages in the expression of thought and broadcasting were removed. 
However, restrictions attached to the exercise of these rights in the name of protecting 
territorial unity remained. While legislative reforms bolstered the constitutional 
amendments, in some cases draconian provisions of the penal code were reenacted 
under new names. Prosecutors have a strong tendency to use the new provisions in 
bringing charges against minorities and their advocates.  
While considerable progress had been made in lifting some of the restrictions 
in the anti-terror law, the June 2006 amendments constitute a serious setback. The 
new law has an over-inclusive and purpose-based definition of terrorism, and 
introduces a wide and long list of “terrorist offences,” brings new restrictions on free 
speech and imposes severe sanctions on the media, including prison sentences for 
journalists. It also reintroduces the temporary closures of publications without a 
formal hearing.  
The ECtHR’s Doğan judgment prompted Turkey to enact a compensation law 
for IDPs in July 2004. The stated purposes of the law were the fulfilment of 
commitments made to the EU and non-payment of high compensation in Strasbourg. 
These efforts paid off: In January 2006, only three months after the law came into 
effect, the ECtHR ruled in İçyer that the law provides an effective domestic remedy.  
With recent amendments to the Law on Associations, the establishment of 
associations is no longer subject to prior authorization and there is more space for the 
establishment of associations by minorities or for advocating minority rights. 
Associations are allowed to use minority languages in their non-official 
correspondence. However, the establishment of associations engaging in “prohibited 
activities” is prohibited. While “prohibited activities” are not defined, one might 
suspect that the restriction aims to protect the constitutional principles of territorial 
unity and national security. The over-inclusive reading of these principles by Turkish 
prosecutors and judges in the past have resulted in the inclusion among prohibited 
purposes, inter alia, of the advocacy of peaceful solutions to the Kurdish problem, 
including the granting of minority status to the Kurds.  
The domestic framework governing political parties is one area that needs 
further reforms to achieve harmonization with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. While the 
threshold for the dissolution of a political party has been increased under Article 69 of 
the Constitution, the Law on Political Parties (LPP) still contains several restrictions 
which contradict the letter and spirit of the relevant constitutional provisions as well 
as the standards established by the ECtHR. Article 96(3) prohibits the use of the word 
“communist” in the name of a political party, notwithstanding the ECtHR’s 
unequivocal ruling in United Communist Party. Another problematic provision of the 
LPP is Article 81, which bans political parties from “arguing” that minorities exist in 
Turkey, promoting minority languages and cultures, and using minority languages in 
their written materials, activities and statements. 
With the EU process, Turkey found itself having to fulfil the minority 
protection conditionality, notwithstanding the challenge the latter posed to its official 
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policies under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Since Lausanne, when the newly founded 
republic was compelled by Western powers to grant minority status to its non-Muslim 
population, minority rights have been associated with foreign interference in internal 
affairs, and portrayed in the official discourse as a once and for all granting of special 
treatment limited to non-Muslims. The de jure protection granted to all non-Muslims 
under Lausanne was de facto restricted to Armenians, Rums and Jews, unlawfully 
excluding others such as the Assyrians.  
It was against this historical background that Turkey found itself having to 
fulfill the EU’s minority protection conditionality. A number of constitutional and 
legislative reforms were undertaken in the last few years, granting minorities limited 
and conditional rights to broadcasting in national public and private television and 
radio stations, the right to teach and learn their languages in private courses and 
removing some of the restrictions on the property rights of non-Muslims. However, 
various minorities’ demands for public education in mother tongue have not been met; 
broadcasting is limited to five selected minority languages, subject to time and 
content restrictions and prohibitive red tape requirements; and no legal framework has 
been adopted to allow the return of confiscated properties or the payment of 
compensation to non-Muslim foundations; the legislature carefully avoided any 
explicit reference in the letter and spirit of the reform laws that could suggest the 
reformulation of the official policy on minorities and made minorities’ exercise of 
their limited rights prohibitively difficult by attaching restrictive conditions and 
conferring on bureaucrats a virtually unchecked authority in implementing the laws 
through executive regulations.  
The EU’s accession conditionality has confronted Turkey with the challenge 
to re-construct its discriminatory citizenship definition and practices. Not only various 
minorities, but also a significant segment of the majority feels excluded by the ethnic 
and religious based citizenship in Turkey. Enacting legal reforms has proved to be a 
necessary but insufficient condition of bringing real and meaningful change in social 
and official attitudes towards minorities. The internalization of reforms requires a 
radical transformation of the prevalent mentality of both the state and the society. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
An analysis of the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of human and 
minority rights in Turkey would be incomplete without the simultaneous study of the 
EU accession process as an equally significant external factor. This is most evident in 
the fact that, notwithstanding the high number of judgments the ECtHR has issued 
against Turkey over the years, their execution has started only after the initiation of 
the EU reform process and accelerated after the JDP came to power in 2002. Since the 
declaration of Turkey as an official candidate for accession in 1999, the EU has 
played a central role in monitoring the Turkish Government’s execution of the ECtHR 
case law, documenting the progress achieved in that regard and the outstanding issues, 
and providing training to key judicial and administrative authorities in tandem with 
the Council of Europe.  
The ways in which the Strasbourg jurisprudence has made a difference in the 
Turkish case seems to depend on various factors, such as the type of violation in 
question, the commitment of the government to executing the judgment concerned, 
the political nature of the issue, the number of judgments and the amount of 
compensation Turkey was required to pay. While the government has come a long 
way in executing the ECtHR’s judgments on Article 3, for example, the same cannot 
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be argued for the execution of case law concerning Article 10. The relative success in 
the execution of Article 3 judgments can be explained by a combination of various 
factors: the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture under customary 
international law, the absolute prohibition of torture under the ECHR and the non-
derogable nature of the duty not to torture, the political will demonstrated by the JDP 
government in its campaign on “zero tolerance to torture,” and the relative ease in 
creating strong public support against torture and ill treatment. In contrast, freedom of 
expression is not a jus cogens principle, its protection under the ECHR is not absolute 
but is subject to certain restrictions, the JDP government’s commitment to freedom of 
expression is highly questionable in view especially of the draconian provisions 
introduced to the Penal Code and the anti-terror law, the highly political nature of 
Article 10 cases, most of which are linked to the Kurdish question, and the lack of 
public support for the absolute protection of freedom speech, particularly when such 
speech concerns the expression of alternative views on the Kurdish question and 
laicism.  
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ANNEX II:  MAPPING OF RESEARCH COMPETENCES REPORT 
 
Research Institution 1: İstanbul Bilgi University Human Rights Law Research 
Center 
 
The Human Rights Law Research Centre at Istanbul Bilgi University was established 
in December 2000. Since that time, the Centre has been active in the pursuit of raising 
the awareness of, protecting and developing human rights law and humanitarian law 
both domestically and internationally. In addition to organising conferences, 
symposiums, seminars and round table discussions, both at home and abroad, the 
Centre is also working in unison with a number of national and international 
organisations, both public and private, on various projects in the subject of human 
rights. The Centre monitors all national and international judicial decisions regarding 
human rights and humanitarian law. Through its unique website, the Centre presents 
and publicises the ratification of related conventions and their subsequent 
implementation by Turkey. The reports and decisions of United Nations, International 
Labour Organisation, the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights 
regarding human rights in Turkey can be viewed at this site. The Centre's web site is 
currently the only source that provides information on human rights in Turkey along 
with related news and documents presented in Turkish with detailed summaries in 
English for the international audience. 
 
Address:  
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
İnsan Hakları Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi  
Kurtuluş Deresi Caddesi No:47 
Dolapdere 34440 İstanbul 
 
Tel: +(90) 212 253 87 42 
Fax: + (90) 212 253 89 11 
Website: http://insanhaklarimerkezi.bilgi.edu.tr  
Email: insanhaklarimerkezi@bilgi.edu.tr 
 
Leading experts: Prof. Dr. İlter Turan, Prof. Dr. Uğur Alacakaptan, Prof. Dr. Rona 
Aybay, Prof. Dr. Cemal Bali Akal, Prof. Dr. Şule Kut, Prof. Dr. Turgut Tarhanlı, Doç. 
Dr. Serap Yazıcı, Doç. Dr. Arus Yumul ve Yard. Doç. Dr. Hale Bolak, Prof. Dr. 
Nurhan Yentürk, İdil Işıl Gül, Galma Jahic. 
 
 
Research Institution 2: Marmara University Human Rights Research and 
Application Centre 
Marmara University Human Rights Research and Application Centre aims to follow 
the national and international developments in the area of human rights and to 
contribute to such developments via scientific research aimed at practical results. The 
Centre also aims to initiate efforts to develop a culture of human rights in Turkey as 
well as contribute to such already existing efforts. Towards these aims, the Centre 
publishes scientific material on the issue of human rights, organizes panels, seminars 
and conferences, carries out academic programs and provides consulting services.  
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Address: 
Hukuk Fakültesi, Tıbbiye Caddesi, 
Haydarpaşa – İstanbul 
 
Tel: + (90) 216 349 84 00 (ext. 1141) 
Fax: + (90) 216 418 87 55 
Website: http://www.marmara.edu.tr/Akademik/?id=51 
Email: odogru@marun.edu.tr 
Leading experts: Prof. Dr. Feridun Yenisey, Prof. Dr. Nuri Centel, Doç. Dr. Turan 
Yıldırım, Doç. Dr. Abdullah Dinçkol 
 
Research Institution 3: İstanbul University Centre for Research and Practice in 
Human Rights Law 
Centre for Research and Practice in Human Rights Law was founded in 1997. The 
Centre is located in the Faculty of Law, University of Istanbul. The aim of the Centre 
is to carry out research and activities in theoretical and practical areas regarding the 
recognition, protection and fostering of human rights by using scientific techniques 
within interdisciplinary approach. The Centre carries organizes and participates in 
seminars, conferences and similar activities related to human rights law both on the 
national and international level, establishes the  necessary archives and libraries, 
opens regular, scientific, occupational and specialization courses and seminars in 
order to train the personnel of the related institutions and associations, to monitor the 
implementation of the Human Rights Conventions, especially European Convention 
on Human Rights in order to reach its aim. In recent activities of the Centre, special 
attention was given to the democratization efforts in Turkey through a series of 
lectures and reports. The Centre has also provided human rights training to public 
servants who are from different public agencies and supported student researches on 
human rights.  
Address: 
İstanbul Üniversitesi  
İnsan Hakları Hukuku Araştrma ve Uygulama Merkezi 
34452 Beyazit –Istanbul 
 
Tel: + (90) 212 522 18 81  
Fax: + (90) 212 522 18 81 
Website: http://www.istanbul.edu.tr/merkezler/ihhaum/english.htm  
Email: webihha@istanbul.edu.tr 
 
Leading experts: Prof. Dr. Rona Serozan, Prof. Dr. Berin Ergin, Prof. Dr. Füsun 
Sokullu Akıncı, Prof.. Dr. Naz Çavuşoğlu, Doç. Dr. Oktay Uygun 
 
 
Research Institution 4: TODİAE Human Rights Research and Documentation 
Center 
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TODAİE Human Rights Research and Documentation Center was established in 
1975. The center's administrative regulation was published in official gazette on 1st of 
June, 1975. The aim of the center is to develop the idea of human rights in Turkey and 
to fulfill the needs of public sector on the subject. The activities of the center are to 
collect national and foreign material on human rights, to gather academic meetings, to 
conduct research and publish relevant materials, to get in touch and cooperate with 
national and international institutions that work for human rights. Since 1975, the 
center has been publishing two periodicals titled Annual of Human Rights and 
Turkish Yearbook of Human Rights. 
Address: 
1 Numaralı Cadde No:8  Yücetepe 01600 Ankara 
 
Tel: (90) 312 231 73 60 (ext.1003) 
Fax: (90) 312 232 52 96 
Website: http://www.todaie.gov.tr/İHADM/ 
Email: ihadm@todaie.gov.tr 
 
Leading experts: The director of the center is Dr. Filiz Kartal. Mesut Gülmez, İbrahim 
Kabaoğlu, Oktay Uygun. 
 
 
Research Institution 5: CES – Boğaziçi University Center for European Studies 
 
The Center was established in 1991, with the objective of conducting interdisciplinary 
research in European studies, emphasizing the cultural dimension of Turco-European 
relations in a comparative framework. In May 2000, the University Senate decided to 
broaden the scope of the studies conducted at the Center to cover all major areas in 
social sciences. The Center for European Studies (CES) aims at providing an 
academic and intellectual forum on multiple aspects of the European integration 
process with an emphasis on the accession of Turkey and other candidates. CES 
promotes academic research by assisting university staff in project formulation and 
search for funding. CES also functions as a focal point for debate on EU-Turkey 
relations and a think-tank comprising academics and practitioners from the public and 
private sectors. CES organizes conferences, seminars and lectures open to the public, 
as well as workshops for experts. This gives an opportunity for officials and members 
of non-governmental organizations to interact and develop networks with their 
counterparts in Europe.  
 
Address: 
Fenerli Turbe Sk.No6, Rumelihisarüstü/Istanbul-Turkey 
Istanbul, Turkey, TR-34342 
 
Tel:  + (90) 212-359 73 44 (ext.7344) 
Fax:  + (90) 212-358 15 91 
Website:  http://www.ces.boun.edu.tr/  
Email: ces@boun.edu.tr  
 
Leading experts: Prof. Der. Kemal Kirişçi, Prof. Dr. Refik Erzan, Prof. Dr. Çağlar 
Keyder, Prof. Dr. Binnaz Toprak, Prof. Dr. Şevket Pamuk, Prof. Dr. Mehmet Kaytaz, 
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Prof. Dr. Fikret Adaman, Prof. Dr. Mine Eder, Prof. Dr. Hakan Yılmaz, Associate 
Prof. Bilge Ataca, Associate Prof. Duygu Köksal, Associate Prof. Gül Sosay 
 
 
Research Institution 6: ALT – Association for Liberal Thinking 
 
Association for Liberal Thinking was established informally by a few like-minded 
people in 26 December 1992. It gained official status as an Association on 1 April 
1994. The objectives of ALT as a non-profit, non-governmental organization are to 
introduce to Turkish public the richness of the intellectual tradition that lay at the 
heart of the liberal democratic civilization; to engage in activities that promote 
understanding and acceptance of values like liberty, justice, peace, human rights, the 
rule of law, tolerance; to encourage development of academic researches on liberal 
themes; and to contribute to finding effective solutions to Turkey's political and 
economic problems within the liberal thought. ALT does not involve in day-to-day 
politics and have no direct links with any political party or movement. Instead, as an 
independent intellectual grouping, it aims to set and influence broader political 
debates so as to contribute to the liberalization of Turkey in economic and political 
fields. ALT brings together like-minded people whose belief in and commitment to 
liberty, free market economy, human rights and liberal democracy have been proved 
by their intellectual and professional work. It publishes reports, books and journals; 
holds national and international symposia; develops and carries out educational 
programs.  
 
Address: 
GMK Bulvarı 
No: 108/17 06570 Maltepe-Ankara 
 
Tel: +(90) 312 230 87 03 
Fax: +(90) 312 230 8003 
Website: http://www.liberal-dt.org.tr/  
Email: info@liberal-dt.org.tr  
 
Leading experts: Since ALT is not a research center in the traditional sense, it does 
not regularly employ experts but rather works with select experts on project-based 
contracts. Experts that work more regularly with ALT are Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı, Dr. 
Murat Yılmaz and Prof. Dr. Atilla Yayla.  
   
 
Research Institution 7: ATAUM – Ankara University European Societies 
Research and Application Centre 
 
ATAUM has been established with the aim of providing trainings to public officials 
and private sector members on multiple aspects of EU integration, including the rights 
defined in the European Convention of Human Rights. For this purpose, ATAUM 
carries out research independently or in conjunction with other universities in Turkey 
and abroad, organizes national and international conferences and seminars and 
undertakes studies concerning the EU commissioned by other institutions.  
 
Address: 
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Ankara Üniversitesi 
 Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (ATAUM) 
Cemal Gürsel Caddesi, 06590 Cebeci, Ankara 
 
Tel: (90) 312 362 07 62 
Fax: (90) 312 320 50 61 
Website: http://ataum.ankara.edu.tr 
Email: ataum@education.ankara.edu.tr  
 
Leading experts: Erçin Çiğnel Cengiz, Deniz Senemoğlu, Ceren Arslan, Erhan 
Akdemir, Kaya Uysal  
